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Transforming the Work of Geographical 
Indications to Decolonize Racialized Labor 
and Support Agroecology 
Rosemary J. Coombe and S. Ali Malik* 
Critical scholarship on geographical indications (GIs) has 
increasingly focused upon their role in fostering development in the 
Global South. Recent work has drawn welcome attention to issues of 
governance and sparked new debates about the role of the state in GI 
regulation. We argue that this new emphasis needs to be coupled with a 
greater focus upon local social relations of power and interlinked issues 
of social justice. Rather than see GI regimes as apolitical technical 
administrative frameworks, we argue that they govern emerging public 
goods that should be forged to redress extant forms of social inequality 
and foster the inclusion of marginalized actors in commodity value 
chains. In many areas of the world, this will entail close attention to the 
historical specificities of colonial labor relations and their neocolonial 
legacies, which have entrenched conditions of racialized and gendered 
dispossession, particularly in plantation economies. Using examples 
from  South Africa and South Asia, we illustrate how GIs 
conventionally reify territories in a fashion that obscures and/or 
naturalizes exploitative conditions of labor and unequal access to land 
based resources, which are legacies of historical disenfranchisement. 
Like other forms of neoliberal governmentality that support private 
governance for public ends, however, GIs might be shaped to support new 
forms of social justice. We show how issues of labor and place-based 
livelihoods increasingly influence new policy directions within Fair Trade 
agendas while concerns with “decolonizing” agricultural governance now 
animate certification initiatives emerging from new social movements. 
Both initiatives provide models for shaping the governance and regulation 
of GIs in projects of rural territorial development that encompass 
 
* Rosemary J. Coombe is the Tier One Canada Research Chair in Law, Communication and Culture at 
York University, where she is appointed to the Departments of Anthropology and Social Science  
and the Graduate Program in Socio-Legal Studies. S. Ali Malik is a fifth year PhD candidate in the  
Socio-Legal Studies Program at York University. 
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principles of rights-based development to further social movements for 
rural social justice. 
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I. THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF PROMOTING GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
Critical scholarship on the use of geographical indications (GIs)1 to foster rural 
development reveal a marked divergence in opinion between scholars in advanced 
industrial countries who are increasingly critical of the way in which GIs have 
functioned to further sustainable development, empower producer groups, and 
conserve biodiversity, and those in the Global South who continue to express 
confidence that GIs will help to achieve these objectives. The latter still see GI 
 
1. Geographical Indications (GIs) were established as a distinctive category of intellectual 
property (IP) in the 1994 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement. See 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 22(1), Apr. 15, 1994; 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994; LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [ hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement]. Increasingly promoted for use in the Global South, GIs, or marks indicating 
conditions of origin (MICOs) include appellations of source, denominations of origin, collective 
trademarks and certification marks. In many common-law jurisdictions, recognition is possible without 
registration if the MICO is an indication of source for consumers. Some countries in the Global South 
employ the term GI as a generic name for a new form of sui generis protection established by new 
legislation introduced to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. Because the TRIPS Agreement leaves 
discretion with member countries regarding the means and forms of such protections, countries may 
call their protections GIs, but utilize governance frameworks historically applied to denominations of 
origin or collective trademarks, for example. They may also fuse elements from diverse legal vehicles 
and add new ones. See DANIELE GIOVANNUCCI ET AL., GUIDE TO GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: 
LINKING PRODUCTS AND THEIR ORIGINS 8 (2009). Many countries have entrenched contemporary 
GIs as forms of state property when, historically, in European contexts, they would have been held by 
collective stakeholders such as producer associations that upheld quality controls and were responsive 
to local conditions. Moreover, some states in Asia have allowed traders to use them as if they were 
producers, which may further alienate their governance from those who create the goods that bear 
them. See N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Prabha S. Nair & Aravind K. Babu, Exploring the Relationship Between 
Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge: An Analysis of the Legal Tools for the Protection of 
GIs in Asia (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper, 2007). 
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protections as possessing the capacity to transform artisans, farmers, smallholders, 
pastoralists, and fishing peoples from raw material producers to exporters of 
differentiated products easily identifiable in global markets while stoking social 
pride in local products, commanding respect, and reaping price premiums.2 Such 
optimism seems unwarranted after over a decade of accumulating evidence that 
many countries fail to anticipate or to fully bear the costs of establishing effective 
GI protections3 nevertheless forge them to maintain biodiversity, protect small 
producers, or reduce income inequalities in the regions of the Global South where 
they have been introduced.4 Rather than simply dismiss the optimism which many 
scholars still hold for the use of GIs in the Global South, however, we will use this 
essay to critically direct such hopes in more productive directions, by reflecting 
upon the geopolitical historical conditions of GI expansion, the ideologies GIs 
support, the labor relations they obscure, and the aspirations they might, 
nonetheless, still be shaped to advance. 
Cerkia Bramley is a prominent proponent of using GIs for rural development 
in the Global South.5 Influential in policy circles because of her early research 
legitimating the South African Rooibos tea GI (upon which we will later reflect), 
she provides a positive case for linking GIs to rural development and, in so doing, 
rehearses the dominant arguments put forth by European boosters of GI strategies 
of rural territorial development.6 By remunerating assets involved in the production 
process, Bramley reiterates, “[T]he link between an origin labelled product and its 
area of origin allows for the creation of rents based on the ‘qualities’ of the 
product.”7 In defining product standards and signaling territorial values embedded 
in the product, GI qualification processes enable the capture of price premiums. 
 
2. Justin Hughes, The Limited Promise of Geographical Indications for Farmers in Developing 
Countries, in GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
CULTURE: FOCUS ON ASIA-PACIFIC 61, 66–86 (I. Calboli & W. Ng-Loy eds., 2017). 
3. See, e.g., G.E. Evans & Michael Blakeney, The Protection of Geographical Indications After 
Doha: Quo Vadis?, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 575 (2006). 
4. See CERKIA BRAMLEY, A REVIEW OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD (2011) (overviewing the literature 
on the socioeconomic impact of GIs and considerations relevant to countries in the Global South); 
Sarah Bowen & Ana Valenzuela Zapata, Geographical Indications, Terroir, and Socioeconomic and 
Ecological Sustainability: The Case of Tequila, 25 J. RURAL STUD. 108 (2009) (discussing a case study of 
GI governance that casts doubt on arguments that GIs will protect biodiversity). The term Global 
South is often employed synonymously with post-Cold War economically underdeveloped nation-
states. Conceptually, it embodies transnational spaces and peoples bearing the brunt of contemporary 
capitalist globalization. Generally, Mahler notes “[c]ritical scholarship that falls under the rubric Global 
South is invested in the analysis of the formation of a Global South subjectivity, the study of power 
and racialization within global capitalism in ways that transcend the nation-state as the unit of 
comparative analysis.” Anne Garland Mahler, Global South, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-
0055.xml [ https://perma.cc/9ERD-PUNM] (last updated Oct. 25, 2017). 
5. See Cerkia Bramley & Estelle Biénabe, Why the Need to Consider GIs in the South?, in 
DEVELOPING GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE SOUTH 1 (Cerkia Bramley, Estelle Biénabe & 
Johann Kirsten eds., 2013). 
6. See BRAMLEY, supra note 4. 
7. Id. at 5. 
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Finally: 
[B]y preventing the diversion of income from misappropriation, GIs  
enable producers to potentially enjoy larger income flows from their origin 
based production processes. In this way GIs lead to a more equitable 
distribution of value for local producers and communities . . . bringing an 
inclusive territorial benefit to all actors within the region.8 
Other GI advocates laud indirect benefits, such as increased investment, land 
values, new potentials for agro-tourism, and greater employment opportunities, 
because spin-off industries, such as agro-tourism, work to strengthen the territorial 
brand.9 Moreover, by “enabling communities to continue producing their traditional 
products,” GIs “contribute to the preservation of cultural heritage.”10 
Given how few advantages developing and least developed countries (to use 
TRIPs nomenclature) were provided under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), it is not surprising that 
GIs were embraced for the potential they afford to enhance markets for the unique, 
traditional, regional foodstuffs and handicrafts that developing countries appear to 
have in great abundance.11 Nonetheless, readers should recognize that many of the 
proponents of GI expansion are supported and funded by the European Union 
(EU), whose interests in extending GI protections to new regions reflect a regional 
economic agenda in global trade relations. The EU aspires to protect and entrench 
a form of intellectual property (IP) in which Europe has a great competitive 
advantage but which other industrialized states in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) regard as unwarranted protectionism.12 GIs are a European mechanism for 
rural territorial development that has been exported to regions in the Global South 
 
8. Id. (citing Daphne Zografos, Geographical Indications & Socio-Economic Development 
(IQsensato, Working Paper No. 3, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1628534 [https://perma.cc/J62S-6TGR]). 
9. BRAMLEY, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Kasturi Das, Prospects and Challenges of Geographical 
Indications in India, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 148 (2010)). 
10. Id. at 5; see also Tomer Broude, Taking ‘Trade and Culture’ Seriously: Geographical Indications 
and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2005); Daniel W. Gade, 
Tradition, Territory, and Terroir in French Viniculture: Cassis, France, and Appellation Contrôlée, 94 
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 848 (2004). Even in the European context, however, not all GI 
governance regimes achieve such ends. For example, state-directed systems, such as the Protected GI 
scheme in Ireland, appear to be dominated by management perspectives more in keeping with food 
safety and quality regulation than with developing place-based product linkages between food and 
territory. See Ricky Conneely & Marie Mahon, Protected Geographical Indications: Institutional Roles in 
Food Systems Governance and Rural Development, 60 GEOFORUM 14 (2015).  
11. Nicole Aylwin & Rosemary J. Coombe, Marks Indicating Conditions of Origin in Rights-
Based Sustainable Development, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753, 774 (2014); see also Michael Blakeney, 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge by Geographical Indications, in TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, 
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 87 
(Christoph Antons ed., 2009).  
12. See GIOVANNUCCI ET AL., supra note 1, at 63–64; Irene Calboli, Expanding the Protection  
of Geographical Indications of Origin Under TRIPS: “Old” Debate or “New” Opportunity?, 10  
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 186 (2006); Rosemary J. Coombe, Sarah Ives & Daniel Huizenga, 
Geographical Indications: The Promise, Perils and Politics of Protecting Place-Based Products, in THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 207, 210–11 (2014). 
Final to Printer_Coombe & Malik (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018 10:34 AM 
2018] WORK OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 367 
as part of a geopolitical strategy for maintaining European interests in global trade 
regimes. 
EU support and trade pressures for the extension of GI protection (on behalf 
of France and Mediterranean member states), along with the advocacy work of 
European state overseas development offices and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) intermediaries were influential in popularizing and naturalizing a  
narrative in which GIs mark products “deeply rooted in tradition, culture and 
geography . . . [that] support rural development . . . promote new job opportunities” 
and “preserve the environment,” so that globalization does not diminish “the 
diversity, quality and tradition of origin products” while enabling producers to rely 
upon these “for the sustainable development of their communities.”13 The tropes 
of authenticity used to define such typical products “are deliberately cultivated in a 
specific European ‘mode of production,’ . . . enshrined in EU Regulations”14 that 
encouraged such interventions as part of neoliberal state decentralization 
trajectories. “The essence of this mode of production is its integration of cultural, 
financial, natural, and social capital into a form of territorial IP.”15 
GIs are important vehicles in a more comprehensive European agricultural 
and rural development policy, a means for investing in lagging economies to build 
infrastructure, prevent emigration, and attract tourism while helping to preserve 
cultural heritage, thereby meeting several regional policy objectives. The success of 
GIs in Europe clearly relies upon a whole range of other supports and subsidies as 
well as a legal context in which human rights are “constitutionalized” within IP 
rights protections.16 Without such supports and normative framings, however, GIs 
cannot simply be transplanted and expected to function in the same way. For 
example, aspects of such European territorial development strategies are being 
imported wholesale in Bolivia, where newly established viticultural regions marked 
by denominations of origin welcome tourists to a South American Andalusia—but 
they do so by increasing income inequalities and further dispossessing peasants and 
indigenous peoples.17 
 
13. Hughes, supra note 2, at 66 (citing ORGANISATION FOR AN INTERNATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS NETWORK, TERUEL DECLARATION 1 (2009)); see also Catherine Saez, 
GIs the “Darling” of Europe, but Protection a Challenge for All, Producers Say, INTELL. PROP. WATCH 
(May 28, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/05/28/gis-the-darling-of-europe-but-protection-a-
challenge-for-all-producers-say/ [https://perma.cc/KLF3-23QZ]. 
14. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Knowledge Economy and Its Cultures: Neoliberal Technologies and 
Latin American Reterritorializations, 6 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 247, 263 (2016). 
15. Id. 
16. See Christophe Geiger, Implementing Intellectual Property Provisions in Human Rights 
Instruments: Towards a New Social Contract for the Protection of Intangibles, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 661 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Christophe 
Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3d ed. 2012); Christophe Geiger, 
Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and International) Intellectual Property Law, in 
COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012).  
17. See Katherine L. Turner et al., Creole Hens and Ranga-Ranga: Campesino Foodways and 
Biocultural Resource-Based Development in the Central Valley of Tarija, Bolivia, 6 AGRICULTURE 1 (2016); 
see also Rosemary J. Coombe & Katherine L. Turner, Territory as Intellectual Property: Prospects for 
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While various NGOs have attempted to use European rural cultural economy 
strategies to effect new forms of territorial development in the Global South 
(particularly in Latin America), the work of IP in these efforts has been uneven and 
sporadic, with the use of marks indicating conditions of origin (MICOs), such as 
denominations of origin, often becoming dependent upon state priorities rather 
than local needs. Too frequently, efforts to develop MICOs have assumed foreign 
consumers and export markets; such gourmet branding strategies are especially 
susceptible to elite capture.18 Whether the mimicry of such models of European 
rural territorial development can effectively guide regions of the world that have 
historically endured European colonial government and occupation without further 
entrenching racialized colonial legacies is one of the broader and more 
uncomfortable questions we pose here. This is a particularly significant question as 
it pertains to goods still produced in plantation conditions and postcolonial political 
contexts where labor relations have not been decolonized, nor modern social 
welfare supports put into place. 
In earlier work, we19 have explored examples from the Global South to argue 
that both sui generis GIs and other MICOs need to be critically evaluated as forms 
of local governance and socially assessed according to criteria of rights-based 
development.20 We have shown how the rhetoric used to promote GIs tends to 
obscure social relations of production21 by projecting and naturalizing particular 
social imaginaries22 that ignore or deny historical forms of social inequality, 
legitimating forms of GI governance that tend to further entrench these inequalities. 
More recently, we suggested that certification strategies need to evolve in South and 
Southeast Asia to address issues of gender and racial inequality, the ongoing 
dispossession of lands and losses of biodiversity through monocropping, and the 
impact of such processes in increasing precarity in employment and undermining 
women’s livelihood security.23 
In this Article, we will summarize and elaborate upon these earlier arguments 
in conversation with other scholars engaged in critical research on GI governance. 
Although we welcome the new scholarly attention to GI governance and share 
 
Food Sovereignty Under Regimes of Informational Capital (Apr. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with authors). 
18. Katherine L. Turner, Iain J. Davidson-Hunt & Ian Hudson, Wine, Cheese and Building a 
Gourmet Territory: Biocultural Resource-Based Development Strategies in Bolivia, 39 CAN. J. DEV. STUD. 19 
(2017).  
19. The use of the authorial ‘we’ refers to Coombe’s work with a group of graduate students 
and postdoctoral fellows over several years, including Nicole Aylwin, Marc Griebel, Daniel Huizenga, 
Sarah Ives, Kate L. Turner, and S. Ali Malik.  
20. See Rosemary J. Coombe & Nicole Aylwin, Bordering Diversity and Desire: Using Intellectual 
Property to Mark Place-Based Products, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2027 (2011). 
21. See Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12, at 224. 
22. Id.  
23.  See Rosemary J. Coombe & S. Ali Malik, Rethinking the Work of Geographical Indications in 
Asia: Addressing Hidden Geographies of Gendered Labor, in GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURE: FOCUS ON ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 2, at 
87.  
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critics’ concerns about the role of the state in many new sui generis GI regimes,24 we 
also believe that GIs need to be more attentive to local relations of power and 
designed to build the political capacities of those most marginalized in commodity 
value chains. If GIs are increasingly promoted in the Global South as part of a 
strategy of rural territorial development, it is imperative that they are accompanied 
by rights-based development norms and practices that expand the range of social 
justice concerns brought to bear upon their governance. Moreover, these norms of 
thought and practice need to be devised to prevent GIs from being used to further 
entrench surviving colonial labor relations and the discriminatory forms of 
racialized and gendered marginalization that postcolonial conditions have yet to 
alleviate. 
Taking issue with some contemporary positions on the effect of GIs, we argue 
that rather than decommodify fetishized goods,25 dominant GI strategies tend, 
instead, to fetishize territories in a fashion that obscures the conditions of human 
labor that constituted them as such. We illustrate this through historical 
considerations of two GIs lauded as providing models for rural territorial 
development (Rooibos and Darjeeling teas) to show how regional branding may be 
symbolically as well as materially accomplished so as to naturalize ongoing forms of 
dispossession in regions historically dominated by plantation economies. Then, by 
considering the histories of two regions (in India and Sri Lanka) now registered for 
potential GI development and extolled as sites for territorial branding, we delineate 
the social formations of race and gender likely to be further ensconced through such 
projects. Activists in the Fair Trade movement share this interest in addressing the 
social marginalization and gendered and racialized subject positions produced by 
plantation economies and seek to ensure that certifications of fairness evolve to 
encompass labor standards that provide better justice to workers in agricultural 
sectors. Concerns with avoiding the reproduction of colonial conditions of 
production and decolonizing agricultural economic governance are, we will show, 
echoed in a number of other certification initiatives that suggest new norms and 
values that might inform future GI regimes. Ultimately, we suggest that the use of 
GIs in rural territorial development projects should incorporate principles of rights 
based development to further social movements for food sovereignty and 
agricultural social justice. 
II. EMERGING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT: GOVERNMENT AND REGULATION 
Recent scholarship suggests that the benefits of using GIs are rarely as positive 
as the ideal scenarios outlined by their proponents. Both the particularities of local 
 
24. Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 20, at 2033–35; see also Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11. 
25. See, e.g., Franck Galtier, Giovanni Belletti & Andrea Marescotti, Factors Constraining Building 
Effective and Fair Geographical Indications for Coffee: Insights from a Dominican Case Study, 31  
DEV. POL’Y REV. 597 (2013) [hereinafter Galtier, Belletti & Marescotti, Factors]; Franck Galtier, 
Giovanni Belletti & Andrea Marescotti, Are Geographical Indications a Way to “Decommodify” the Coffee 
Market?, in 12TH CONGRESS EUR. ASS’N AGRIC. ECONOMISTS – EAAE 2008 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
Galtier, Belletti & Marescotti, Geographical Indications]. 
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social conditions and the ways in which GI regimes have been introduced and 
managed in the Global South have limited the range and distribution of their 
benefits. Barham, Evans and Blakeney, and Hughes, for example, caution against 
viewing GIs as a universal prescription for rural development, arguing that local 
contexts condition their impacts.26 Nonetheless, most of the relevant local contexts 
these scholars point to are economic ones in which to assess comparative costs and 
benefits; countries are merely warned about the high costs of administering these 
programs. We will suggest that other historical contexts are relevant if GIs are to 
serve issues of justice and well-being that go beyond gross increases in income to 
attend to distributions of benefits, sustainability, and local capacity building. 
After years of arguing that GIs should be assessed in terms of the political 
economies of their governance,27 we find it heartening that more recent studies of 
GIs attend critically to their institutional implementation with particular attention 
to their local social impacts and the inclusions and exclusions they effect. Scholars 
in the Global South have been particularly interested in GIs as means “to uplift the 
economic condition of the poor people . . . who contribute to many key products 
of export” while (for example) providing “better protection to Indian indigenous 
knowledge and [the] reputation of products originating from India.”28 The ultimate 
issue is how and under what conditions GI management can empower all producers 
along the value chain. It is now widely acknowledged that the necessary institution 
building for widespread social benefits will require strong public intervention.29 
New case studies of GIs in the Global South attempt to identify the ideal role for 
the state in “achieving the virtuous circle of GIs”30 where the “long-standing 
 
26. See Dominique Barjolle et al., The Role of the State for Geographical Indications of Coffee: Case 
Studies from Colombia and Kenya, 98 WORLD DEV. 105 (2017); Delphine Marie-Vivien, The Role of the 
State in the Protection of Geographical Indications: From Disengagement in France/Europe to Significant 
Involvement in India, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 121 (2010); see also Elizabeth Barham, Translating 
Terroir: The Global Challenge of French AOC Labeling, 19 J. RURAL. STUD. 127 (2003); Evans & 
Blakeney, supra note 3, at 575; Hughes, supra note 2. 
27. See Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11; Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 2027; Rosemary  
J. Coombe, Steven Schnoor & Mohsen Ahmed, Bearing Cultural Distinction: Informational Capitalism 
and New Expectations for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 891 (2007). 
28. See K.D. Raju & Shivangi Tiwari, The Management of Geographical Indications: Post 
Registration Challenges and Opportunities, 42 DECISION 293 (2015). 
29. Giovanni Belletti, Andrea Marescotti & Jean-Marc Touzard, Geographical Indications, Public 
Goods, and Sustainable Development: The Roles of Actors’ Strategies and Public Policies, 98 WORLD  
DEV. 45 (2015). 
30. Barjolle, supra note 26, at 105 (where factors in the coffee sector are explained as differing 
from those pertaining to conventional GIs that pose obstacles to achieving the virtuous circle of GIs). 
As described by Vandecandelaere, Arfini, Belletti, and Marescotti: 
The virtuous circle starts from the long-standing reputation of specific qualities attributed 
to the origin (emblematic examples are Champagne, Parmigiano Reggiano, or Tequila). This 
reputation for quality enhances consumers’ willingness to pay for the product; consumers 
pay more for the product compared to substitute products under certain conditions; finally, 
this economic return may allow value chain actors to maintain local, fair, and traditional 
farming and trading practices. 
EMILIE VANDECANDELAERE, FILIPPO ARFINI, GIOVANNI BELLETTI & ANDREA MARESCOTTI, 
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, LINKING PEOPLE, PLACES AND PRODUCTS: A 
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reputation of specific qualities attributed to the origin” enhances consumer 
willingness to pay a premium for the product, producing an “economic return 
[which] may allow value chain actors to maintain local, fair, and traditional farming 
and trading practices.”31 Unfortunately, however, there is little evidence that state 
governments are interested in using GIs for redistributing power among 
stakeholders or empowering local communities. Rather more evidence suggests that 
GI institutions tend to be dominated by powerful industry groups interested in 
maintaining their own positions of privilege.32 
Ironically, then, a neoliberal strategy of decentralized local territorial 
development has been met with increasing demands for enhanced state oversight 
and support, precisely because of the local social inequities and negative 
environmental consequences that might otherwise result. As sociologist Sarah 
Bowen argues, in the context of government withdrawal from agriculture and rural 
social support systems, sustainability and equity are unlikely to be achieved unless 
all producers receive institutional instruments to facilitate the organization required 
by GI supply chains.33 Stronger public intervention and proactive public policies are 
also justified on the basis that GIs provide public goods.34 
If GI implementation calls for new forms of intervention, there is no necessary 
common regulatory framework for their governance. Thus, in some countries (such 
as India), state institutions have assumed the role of proprietors who grant rights to 
use the indication to others designated merely as authorized users, while leaving the 
identities of producers and mechanisms for their compensation opaque.35 In the 
case of sui generis GIs in the Global South (in countries which do not use traditional 
trademark systems or do so without conventional safeguards), public-private sector 
collaboration is inevitable, raising the prospect that central governments, in 
collaboration with large corporate producer associations, will use the process to 
extract economic rents.36 This development could potentially strengthen 
 
GUIDE TO PROMOTING QUALITY LINKED TO GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN AND SUSTAINABLE 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 1 (2009).  
31. Barjolle, supra note 26, at 105; see also Marie-Vivien, supra note 26. 
32. Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11, at 781–83, and sources cited therein; Coombe & Aylwin, 
supra note 20, at 2033–36, and sources cited therein. As we have elsewhere shown: 
The oldest appellations of origin were developed to protect aristocratic traditions and 
continue to reflect class-based privilege, concentrate control over governance in small 
elites, restrict the upward mobility of smallholders, discourage the formation of or supplant 
co-operatives, and entrench poor agricultural working conditions. Many MICO regimes 
have reduced rather than increased local biological and cultural diversity. Moreover, the 
dominant social imaginary offered by proponents for GIs tends to be localized in activities 
of marketing, which do not merely misrepresent social realities but shape them, 
naturalizing hierarchical labor relations and influencing the ways stakeholders come to 
understand their relationships to these products. 
Coombe & Malik, supra note 23, at 90 (internal citations omitted). 
33. See Sarah Bowen, Embedding Local Places in Global Spaces: GIs as a Territorial Development 
Strategy, 75 RURAL SOC. 209 (2010). 
34. Belletti, Marescotti & Touzard, supra note 29.  
35. Raju & Tiwari, supra note 28, at 298. 
36. Hughes, supra note 2, at 74. 
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government’s role in the market, in ways that may reduce rather than increase 
benefits to the majority of rural people. Diverse stakeholders in supply chains are 
simply assumed to share similar interests in developing a region’s reputation 
through the marking of distinctive goods. Nonetheless, it is increasingly evident that 
“GI premiums are rarely shared equitably, particularly in the Asian context, where 
traders are treated as if they are producers and constitute the most powerful actors 
in the value chain.”37 State-driven GI strategies that focus primarily upon increased 
productivity and export earnings tend to further deprive small producers and 
privilege industrial elites wherever they are introduced.38 
In a comparison of GI implementation in the national coffee sectors of 
Colombia and Kenya, for example, agricultural socio-economist Barjolle and her 
coauthors found great differences in state involvement, with the Colombian system 
providing greater divisions of labor, and checks and balances which prevented  
state overreaching.39 Significantly, relatively egalitarian producer groups led the 
movement for branding Colombian coffee, registering foreign trademarks and new 
regional denominations of origin. Although legally GIs were held as collective state 
property, they were delegated to private bodies to manage. As in traditional  
trademark systems, the holder of the certification mark was not entitled to use the 
mark itself so as to maintain the integrity of the certifying process. In the Kenyan 
case, however, the state was both the holder of the mark and the central managing 
body for the certification process, which, we might surmise, makes the process 
more susceptible to patronage and lobbying. 
States that have recently introduced GIs may play a particularly dominant role 
in dictating the terms of their use in national jurisdictions, which may not always 
correspond to local needs; “[c]ommunities have often found it difficult to control 
the social, ecological, and cultural consequences of producing traditional goods for 
modern mass markets.”40 A recent essay in Decision magazine by Raju (an IP 
specialist) and Tiwari (a plant biotechnologist), illustrates the utopian ideals, populist 
desires, and national pride that many people express when contemplating the 
development of Indian GIs.41 The authors are, however, more realistic than many 
others in their sober recognition of state failures in this field to date and the need 
for a better blueprint for improved GI governance. GIs are, in their view, ideally 
held as a community or group right by associations of producers; however, in India 
state governments, departments, and central government agencies have dominated 
GI applications (registering fifty-six percent of the 227 GIs registered since 2004) 
while cooperative associations and societies (primarily representing the handicrafts 
 
37. Coombe & Malik, supra note 23, at 90 (citing Gopalakrishnan, supra note 1).  
38. Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12, at 217. 
39. Barjolle et al., supra note 26, at 115.  
40. Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12, at 216. 
41. See Raju & Tiwari, supra note 28. Madhavi Sunder remarks upon the enthusiasm she 
encountered in India about the introduction of GIs in Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
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sector) have filed only thirty-nine percent of the GIs granted.42 GI proprietors may 
live thousands of miles away from the producers of the goods that bear the mark, 
which limits the monetary benefits that producers are likely to see. In this system, 
producers and producer associations are mere beneficiaries, if and when they are 
even registered as such, which is seldom the case. Indeed, there are dozens of GIs 
registered for which there are few or no beneficiaries listed despite the known 
identities of hundreds of producers of the registered product. Raju and Tiwari thus 
suggest the development new institutions more attentive to social equities and local 
capacity building.43 
In Latin America, economist Mancini argues that GIs intended to further rural 
development by inserting territorially marked goods into global value chains all too 
often exclude smallholder farmers in marginalized regions.44 Many GI initiatives 
lack independent governance mechanisms, and ignore the perspectives of the full 
range of stakeholders in conditions of greatly unequal power relations. Some critics 
optimistically suggest that GI governance functions need merely be decentralized 
because municipal governments are more sensitive to local social relations.45 While 
this might sometimes be the case, municipal governments may also be more 
invested in the prejudices that uphold local forms of exclusion and more beholden 
to entrenched authority and respectful of elite privilege. Communities have often 
found it difficult to control the social, ecological, or cultural consequences of 
producing traditional goods for modern markets, and local governments have often 
encouraged the substitution of traditional knowledge and methods with practices 
deemed more conducive to modernization, with often dire consequences for 
minorities and the equities of benefit sharing.46 
There are several community-based enterprises that market local products and 
celebrate the distinctiveness of their origins in the Global South; the most successful 
of these have involved supports at many scales, including assistance in the 
constitution of cooperatives, the building of transnational partnerships with CSOs 
for the creation of marketing strategies, and the facilitation of communications 
 
42. Universities and foreign holders claim the remainder of registrations. Raju & Tiwari, supra 
note 28, at 298. 
43. The authors propose a governance model for a GI for traditional Kerala medicine that puts 
emphasis on inclusive structures and institutions, participatory deliberation, equity across the value 
chain, and affiliation with civil society actors while emphasizing transparency and accountability in 
governance, and insisting upon more reliable and equitable benefit sharing which delivers collective 
social welfare, infrastructural and environmental benefits, as well as individual monetary 
compensations. Id. It thereby includes many of the features that we associate with rights-based 
approaches to development, which we explore in the final section of this Article. 
44. See Maria Cecilia Mancini, Geographical Indications in Latin America Value Chains: A 
“Branding from Below” Strategy or a Mechanism Excluding the Poorest?, 32 J. RURAL STUD. 295 (2013). 
45. Barjolle et al., supra note 26, at 108; Claire Durand & Stéphane Fournier, Can Geographical 
Indications Modernize Indonesian and Vietnamese Agriculture? Analyzing the Role of National and Local 
Governments and Producers’ Strategies, 98 WORLD DEV. 93 (2015). 
46. See, e.g., ANITA SAY CHAN, NETWORKING PERIPHERIES: TECHNOLOGICAL FUTURES AND 
THE MYTH OF DIGITAL UNIVERSALISM 23–26 (2013); Durand & Fornier, supra note 45, at 98–100. 
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between communities and national institutions.47 We have pointed to successful 
MICO strategies which link communities in the Global South and the Global North 
through transnational NGO networks to support new forms of solidarity and 
exchange,48 particularly with relation to goods such as tea and coffee where women 
are dominant in both producer and consumer sectors.49 More recent scholarship 
has recognized that GI regimes are often devised and implemented without 
significant and necessary state supports; non-state and transnational networks of 
actors may need to be involved to deliver maximum economic and social benefits.50 
As we will later suggest, a movement away from the state as the singular actor vested 
with obligations to encompass a broader field of social responsibilities to the rights 
claims and livelihood needs of the disenfranchised is also congruent with 
understandings of rights-based development practices. 
However welcome this new emphasis on GI governance, most of this  
literature still presumes that producers are independent farmers or artisans,  
autonomous from the bodies that hold GIs or those who are authorized to use 
them, who need only seek inclusion in the “virtuous circle.”51 Our research indicates 
that this is seldom the case; instead, many GIs serve to obscure and indeed may 
legitimate oppressive conditions of production.52 Few critics address local  
conditions of land ownership and labor relations in their assumptions that there 
simply are “local, fair, and traditional farming and trading practices”53 to be  
maintained, despite rather clear evidence that the historical use of GIs in Europe 
tended to uphold rather feudal relations of power and suggestions that new GIs are 
being introduced in a fashion that attempts to undermine peasant cooperatives.54 
If we seriously want to empower local stakeholders, we need to understand 
the processes through which local inequalities were established and became 
entrenched. This requires addressing the historical forces—both material and 
ideological—that have produced existing power imbalances, often on the axis of 
gender, race, and ethnicity. If recent scholarship now focuses on resolutions to 
collective action problems, very little of it squarely addresses the dominant 
sociological forms of economic exclusion from GI participation amongst local 
 
47. See Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11, at 781–84 (discussing Cajamarca cheese and El Ceibo 
chocolate); Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 20, at 2028 (discussing Octavalo weaving). 
48. See Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11, at 783–84; Coombe, supra note 14, at 265 (discussing 
the example of “quinoa real de Lipez”); Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 20, at 2037–38 (exploring the 
examples of Just Change Tea and Café Feminino). 
49. See Allison Loconto, Can Certified-Tea Value Chains Deliver Gender Equality in Tanzania?, 
21 FEMINIST ECON. 191 (2015). 
50. Didier Chabrol et al., Establishing Geographical Indications Without State Involvement? 
Learning from Case Studies in Central and West Africa, 98 WORLD DEV. 68 (2015).  
51. Barjolle et al., supra note 26, at 105. 
52. See Coombe & Malik, supra note 23. 
53. Barjolle et al., supra note 26, at 116.  
54. Gabriela Vargas-Cetina, Corporations, Cooperatives, and the State: Examples from Italy, 52 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S127 (2011). 
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producer groups and their historical constitution.55 We would argue that the time is 
ripe to consider issues of race and labor in GI governance and the need to alter and 
augment GI strategies with additional forms of social justice certification that 
challenge entrenched colonial modes of production. 
Indeed, we would suggest that rather than decommodify goods by linking 
them back to their territorial origins, and thereby undermining their fetishism as 
commodities,56 many GIs function instead to fetishize territories in a fashion that 
naturalizes rather than challenges the historical social relations of labor which 
constitutes territory as such. Moreover, to understand this process, we must 
acknowledge that the GI, like other MICOs, does its work of governing symbolically 
as well as materially through forms of enchantment that have historical provenance 
and enduring consequence. The rhetorical tropes used to assert typicality in 
rationales for seeking protection for GIs and other MICOs, in the promotion of 
their use by “communities” and in their characteristic forms of advertising are 
generic ones in which a standardized social imaginary is projected and reproduced 
of a given territory’s specific and traditional character.57 Social imaginaries are ways 
of understanding the social that become social entities in themselves, mediating 
collective life, by way of representations which may acquire immense institutional 
force.58 
The assertion of naturalized synergies between the qualities of a territory, 
the characteristics of its goods, the traditions of its people, and the 
importance of these to their cultural identity has become orthodox for 
those extolling the virtues of introducing GIs and [tends to become 
hegemonic] in the areas from which the goods they mark originate. The use 
of GIs tends to imbue products with distinct attributes that 
unproblematically reflect both a local biodiversity and a local cultural 
distinction which are presumed to be isomorphic with a “community.” 
Thus, a stable, unified and harmonious “place” is ideally imagined, 
represented and, ultimately perhaps, even experienced.59 
We will illustrate this through brief historical and sociological journeys into two 
regions famous for their tea gardens and celebrated for obtaining two of the first 
twenty-first century GIs in the Global South. 
 
 
55. For an example of scholarship that argues in favor of a participatory governance process in 
which local artisans and their knowledge must be closely involved, see Amit Basole, Authenticity, 
Innovation, and the Geographical Indication in an Artisanal Industry: The Case of the Banarasi Sari, 18  
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 127 (2015). 
56. Galtier, Belletti & Mariscotti, Factors, supra note 25; Galtier, Belletti & Mariscotti, 
Geographical Indications, supra note 25. 
57. Aylwin & Coombe, supra note 11; Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12.  
58. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction, 14 PUB. CULTURE 
1, 4 (2002).  
59. Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12, at 213. 
Final to Printer_Coombe & Malik (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018 10:34 AM 
376 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:363 
III. GOODS FROM THE ‘TEA GARDENS’: ROOIBOS TEA 
In 2013 WIPO pronounced that: 
For generations, [r]ooibos has provided a healthy, aromatic tea for people 
all around the world and an important economic resource for farmers and 
producers in South Africa. With its importance reverberating throughout 
the tea and IP world, it is poised to bring about change that will positively 
benefit a people, a legal system, and a nation.60 
WIPO here invokes what we call the social imaginary of the GI form when it 
suggests the unity of a people and a nation in this context. Rooibos was considered 
ideally suited for a GI because the link between the tea and its territory was due 
simultaneously to ecological characteristics, local production practices, and local 
culture, engaging both natural and human resources in “a collective process 
involving all local actors, thereby activating all the components of the rural 
economy.”61 Proponents of the GI conveniently ignored the colonial histories of 
dispossession characteristic of the distinctive territories in which rooibos is 
cultivated and the racialized legacies and social discriminations its cultivation 
upholds. 
Rooibos tea is grown in a region of South Africa where apartheid’s racial legacy 
is a continuing reality for distinct peoples, including a precarious underclass of 
colored laborers. GI’s export earnings are significant, and there is no doubt that the 
indication commands great pride, but rather than help to heal apartheid’s wounds, 
the governance of the GI reinscribes its scars. The region in which rooibos grows 
is socially distinctive. In most of South Africa, the vast majority of the population 
is black (seventy-nine percent), with whites and coloreds (a distinctive apartheid-era 
category) each representing another ten percent (an “Asian” category is less than 
one percent).62 The rooibos-growing area, distinctly and differentially, is eighty 
percent colored, fifteen percent white, and only five percent black.63 Our colleague 
Sarah Ives’s fieldwork revealed that both white Afrikaaners and local colored 
residents see themselves as indigenous to the GI region and its distinct ecology. 
Both regard the cultivation of rooibos as part of their natural cultural heritage in an 
area they regard as unique—superior to other parts of the country because it is a 
haven from “the black hordes” numerically prevalent in other regions. White 
Afrikaaner landholders see themselves as God’s chosen people for the area, arguing 
that their blood mingles with the soil to create in rooibos a product iconic of their 
identity.64 
 
60. Disputing a Name, Developing a Geographical Indication, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Apr. 4, 
2011), http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2691 [https://perma.cc/6MPU-7W5H]. 
61. C. Bramley & J.F. Kirsten, Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting Geographical 
Indicators in Agriculture, 46 AGRIKON 69, 84 (2007). 
62. Sarah Ives, Farming the South African “Bush”: Ecologies of Belonging and Exclusion in Rooibos 
Tea, 41 AM. ETHNOLOGY 698, 701 (2014). 
63. Id. 
64. In her fieldwork, Ives found that colored and Afrikaans residents alike identified themselves 
as belonging to the soil and to a natural landscape with resources they regarded as their heritage. Many 
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The rooibos that bears the GI designation comes from a region that has been 
carefully delimited by the South African Rooibos Council—one dominated by white 
farmers with huge landholdings upon which the tea is picked by landless colored 
farm workers.65 One private company (which inherited apartheid-era public assets 
free of charge) processes seventy percent of the tea. Small-scale farmers (members 
of three co-operatives who lease lands from a sympathetic Christian mission) grow 
only two percent of this crop.66 A colored identity is itself the mark of dispossession. 
Today these peoples are recognized internationally, and by many NGOs who assist 
them, as mixed-race descendants of the extinct Bushmen, or, more properly as 
Khoisan indigenous peoples (a mixture of Khoi pastoralists and San hunter 
gatherers), a group historically spurned by both white and black populations, 
because to be colored was to be without a place and something short of fully human 
(listed in fact as amongst the desert animals in apartheid era schoolbooks).67 
Those who harvest the tea are landless descendants of an exploited class of 
captive labor created by a colonial plantation society. They have no other sources 
of work; hired seasonally, they face perpetual threats of eviction in a country whose 
government continually postpones long-promised land redistribution, and offers 
landless workers few forms of social security. With the help of legal aid NGOs, 
some colored communities are attempting to reassert their rights to land in the area. 
In the process of compiling the historical records for these cases (less than 150 years 
ago), they have learned a great deal about the circumstances under which their 
ancestors had these lands seized, were killed (if men), or enslaved and subject to 
violent miscegenation (if women), in what is internationally recognized as a Khoisan 
genocide crying out for reparations. 
The GI primarily benefits white owners of large farms and the large corporate 
processors of the tea. Development NGOs seeking to make rooibos a viable means 
to provide livelihood options for small-scale farmers (while increasing their 
numbers) have done so by supporting the formation of cooperatives trained to meet 
Fair Trade certifications that have now also been extended to the large estates. 
Sociologists Keahey and Murray’s fieldwork research on five distinctive initiatives 
to develop Rooibos standards and certifications to improve small-scale farmers’ 
access to markets for socially and environmentally responsibly produced goods 
 
Afrikaans farmers felt that they were God’s chosen people for this land to which they considered 
themselves “indigenous,” with their “bodies bec[oming] indigenized through exertion in the rooibos 
soil . . . .” Sarah Ives, Uprooting “Indigeneity” in South Africa’s Western Cape: The Plant That Moves, 116 
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 310, 317 (2014). The few colored farmers who held land described it as the 
source of their freedom from employment by whites. They also considered rooibos cultivation to be an 
expression of the dignity of working with their own heritage that testified to their authentic belonging 
in the nation through their connection to the native fynbos landscape. Many regarded the plant’s 
cultivation as protecting a natural native landscape against the invasion of new crops that would change 
the soil composition of one of the last ‘properly South African’ ecologies. Id. at 316. For a compilation 
of Ives’ work on rooibos tea cultivation in the Western Cape, see SARAH IVES, STEEPED IN HERITAGE: 
THE RACIAL POLITICS OF SOUTH AFRICAN ROOIBOS TEA (2017). 
65. See Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12.  
66. Id. at 227.  
67. Id. at 232.  
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found none of them to greatly enhance access for colored farmers.68 Nor were they 
deemed sustainable in the absence of extension systems to deliver training and 
support and fundamental political transformations that might make local 
governance more participatory.69 The  GI’s proponents also fail to consider that the 
industry excludes hundreds of thousands of unemployed black South Africans from 
the industry (whom white farmers in the region refuse to hire).70 One of the world’s 
most progressive national constitutions, embodying a full range of human rights 
principles, was simply ignored in the original creation of this national IP and in its 
ongoing governance. 
The marketing of rooibos reflects the conflictual narratives of its origins and 
histories of cultivation. Most rooibos tea is sold in bulk, which is considered 
unfortunate by those who believe that this proudly South African product should 
be globally marketed as such. The means to communicate how it is native to Africa, 
however, do not necessarily reflect any local circumstances. At least one company 
has adopted the term Khoisan to market rooibos, despite its being the name of a 
people and a marker of their heritage, which in most jurisdictions would not be a 
permissible trademark.71 The fact that the name was considered public domain and 
no contemporary people identifying as Khoisan appear to receive any benefits from 
its use—may indicate that both industry and consumers considered the Khoisan an 
extinct people at the time of this marketing. Marketing images that connote an 
indigenous lifestyle are also conveyed by words like Intaba, borrowed from the 
Xhosa language to denote a general idea of a black African heritage, but one utterly 
unrelated to the area’s farmers, farm workers, or other residents.72 As Rachel 
Wynberg recently affirmed, accusations of biopiracy—the misappropriation and 
patenting of genetic resources and knowledge without consent—have become 
matters of public debate and controversy in the past few years: 
Claiming to be the primary holders of traditional knowledge relating to 
rooibos, indigenous San and Khoi have also launched demands—to date 
unmet—for a stake in rooibos benefits. Meanwhile, small-scale colored 
rooibos producers, despite their involvement in fair trade, remain 
marginalized. All remain embedded in a political history of rooibos that is 
characterized by dispossession and adversity, having been propped up by 
the South African apartheid system.73 
 
68. Jennifer Keahey & Douglas L. Murray, Promise and Perils of Market-Based Sustainability, 3 
SOC. DEV. 143 (2017).  
69. Id. 
70. If the rooibos industry was built upon the undercompensated labor of dispossessed colored 
peoples, recent years have seen a marked increase in black migrant workers from other parts of South 
Africa and from neighboring countries. Both colored and Afrikaans farmers refer to rooibos as 
“indigenous” to the region and black South Africans and immigrants from other Southern African 
countries as alien to it. See Ives, supra note 62, at 702.  
71. Coombe, Ives & Huizenga, supra note 12, at 229.  
72. Id. at 231.  
73. R. Wynberg, Making Sense of Access and Benefit Sharing in the Rooibos Industry: Towards a 
Holistic, Just and Sustainable Framing, 110 S. AFR. J. BOTANY 39, 40 (2017). 
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Neither conservation nor rural development strategies in post-apartheid South 
Africa have been attentive to issues of environmental racialization in the  
country.74 If conservation authorities tend towards excluding the poor from  
conservation management, human rights proponents argue that biodiversity  
conservation efforts are often obstacles to poverty reduction and the rights of the 
marginalized. As environmental geographer Kepe summarizes, many conservation 
efforts are racialized based on a colonial conservation mindset that sees the rural 
poor as the primary cause of environmental degradation or, alternatively, in need of 
handouts and saving by the overwhelmingly white tourist visitors (domestic and 
foreign).75 Issues of equality, paternalism, and rural dispossession of land are rarely 
addressed. 
Our interest in seeing the rooibos GI strategy evolve to address issues of 
rights, recognition, and redistribution is addressed by Wynberg, who proposes an 
access and benefit sharing mechanism (ABSM). An ABSM might enable the 
rooibos industry to recognize the historical injustices from which this agricultural 
sector has benefitted as well as the workers whose knowledge and energies provided 
the fundamental capital that the industry has exploited (and whose ongoing 
dispossession violates the rights post-apartheid South Africa constitutionally 
enshrines).76 Such an ABSM would fairly compensate Khoi and San communities 
as rightful holders of the traditional knowledge of roiboos tea cultivation, alongside 
the tea growers, smallholder cooperatives, landholders, and industry actors with 
whom all actors engaged in bioprospecting or the export trade need to engage. Such 
an institutional development could compensate plantation workers, conserve 
rooibos genetic resources, and certify environmental and socially sustainable forms 
of rooibos cultivation, guiding new research priorities while modelling more 
equitable benefit sharing between what she deems the technology rich Global 
North and the biodiversity rich South.77 Ultimately, she suggests that ABSM must 
be embedded in a wider development agenda in a fashion congruent with the rights-
based development approach we advocate for GI governance. 
IV. GOODS FROM THE ‘TEA GARDENS’: DARJEELING TEA 
Our second example comes from South Asia. The British introduced tea  
plantations to the northeast Indian region of Darjeeling in the mid-nineteenth  
century to meet both domestic demand and to establish an industrial scale export  
commodity. That tea picking and cultivation required (and continues to require) 
hard labor combined with a sparsely populated hilly frontier necessitated the  
importation of a labor force. Indeed, some accounts contend that at the time of 
British colonization there were no more than roughly one hundred inhabitants on 
 
74. Thembela Kepe, Shaped by Race: Why “Race” Still Matters in the Challenges Facing 
Biodiversity Conservation in Africa, 14 LOC. ENV’T 871, 872 (2009). 
75. Id. at 876. 
76. Wynberg, supra note 73, at 40–44, 46–49. 
77. Id. at 40. 
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the land, specifically Lepcha tribal peoples.78 Other Lepcha peoples, lauded for their 
hard work, were brought in from Nepal and later joined by indigenous and tribal 
peoples recruited from Nepal and Bhutan, as well as the provinces of Bihar, Bengal, 
Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh,79 as part of “a larger proletarian 
workforce drawn from indigenous and marginalized groups whose livelihoods were  
threatened . . . .”80 
Darjeeling’s high altitude and temperate climate embodied an environmental 
panacea to the harsh tropical summers endured by British colonialists. This was tied 
to a racialized colonial discourse of environment and corporeality in which 
prolonged exposure to high temperatures were seen as a threat to the integrity of 
the white European body.81 Colonial surveyors designated Darjeeling as having 
“met all the medical requirements to rejuvenate the white race.”82 Initiatives to make 
Darjeeling a British tourist destination were also launched around this time, with 
Darjeeling described as the Indian Alps. Gendered and racialized depictions of the 
local laborers worked in conjunction with the region’s climatic appeal in producing 
an exoticized tourist haven: 
Visuals of women porters carrying staggeringly heavy loads on the one 
hand, and staged dances of Tibetan lamas on the other, circulated widely 
to showcase Himalayan exoticism, complete with anecdotes about 
strapping female porters carrying pianos on their backs. An entire visual 
vocabulary of the Himalayan Orient was produced via lantern slide, 
guidebook, postcard, stereoscope, and eventually, cinema newsreels. [As 
t]he Newman’s guidebook gushed, “A sturdy independent lot these people 
are, looking capable of holding their own with any one. They are, even in 
their dirt, picturesque.”83 
As we shall see, this nineteenth century colonial gendered and racialized 
exoticization of the environment and labor force is reproduced in the Darjeeling 
GI’s social imaginary. 
The Darjeeling Tea GI has been much celebrated as extending IP-based justice 
to the Global South; it was the first of India’s now over 150 registered GIs and a 
huge success in terms of raising export earnings.84 The Tea Board of India controls 
this GI as national patrimony, making eighty-seven plantations a natural garden 
home for a unique tea, based in a naturalized terroir: 
 
78. Kishan Harijan, Role of the Tea Plantation Industry in Human Resource Development in 
Darjeeling Hills-Problems and Perspectives, 2 SALESIAN J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 85 (2011); Jayeeta Sharma, 
A Space that Has Been Laboured on: Mobile Lives and Transcultural Circulation Around Darjeeling and 
the Eastern Himalayas, 2016 TRANSCULTURAL STUD. 54, 59. 
79. Sushma Rai, Plantation and the People of Darjeeling – Disparity and Development of the Region, 
1 INT’L J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY RES. REV. 161, 161 (2016). 
80. Sharma, supra note 78, at 62. 
81. DAVID ARNOLD, THE TROPICS AND THE TRAVELLING GAZE: INDIA, LANDSCAPE, AND 
SCIENCE, 1800–1856, at 42–43, 45, 47–50, 111, 194–96 (2006). 
82. Sharma, supra note 78, at 55. 
83. Id. at 75 (citations omitted). 
84. See Coombe & Malik, supra note 23. 
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What is it that makes the world’s tea aficionados rush to Darjeeling during 
spring-time to “book” the first flush teas? The answer? . . . Darjeeling Tea 
just happens . . . To science, Darjeeling Tea is a strange phenomenon. To 
the faithful, it is a rare blessing. Thankfully, the Darjeeling Tea Estates have 
always lived by their faith—by humbly accepting this unique gift of nature 
and doing everything to retain its natural eloquence. So, Darjeeling tea, 
hand-plucked by local women with magician’s fingers, withered, rolled and 
fermented in orthodox fashion, with the sole intention of bringing out the 
best in them.85 
It is easy to dismiss such romanticism as endemic to advertising’s excess, but 
a few basic facts about the industry quickly disrupt this rosy picture. Such Indian 
Darjeeling tea is picked nearly entirely by the female descendants of indentured 
women from Nepal, who brought this rare tea and their knowledge of its cultivation 
into this region (later incorporated into the state of West Bengal) where they have 
been trapped ever since. The GI marketing campaign represents exploitative  
industrial plantation labor (locally disparaged as “coolie” labor) using this traditional 
knowledge as the caregiving work of the angelic guardians of an Edenic space with 
which they have natural, affective bonds. To cite another Tea Board ad, “Perhaps it 
is the warmth of their touch which gives the brew such sweetness.”86 
It might be argued that such advertising has no real impact on people’s lives 
and livelihoods, and we were originally of that opinion. But Darjeeling (like many 
new GIs in the Global South) is also understood as national cultural patrimony and 
the basis for a new industry—tea tourism—in which women are disciplined to  
perform the smiling docility marked by the GI’s social imaginary. These women 
make one dollar a day, working sixty-hour weeks, an amount far too low to support 
themselves and their families. Theirs is bonded labor; women inherit their jobs and 
are utterly reliant upon plantation owners for housing, health care, their children’s 
education, and access to subsistence plots (degraded by monocultural production) 
for sustenance. 
Working under huge billboards that feature their angelic doppelgangers, which 
are plastered across the countryside, how can tea pluckers transform their  
prospects? To the extent that such branding supports a new tourist industry whose 
profitability is dependent upon satisfying visitor’s expectations, women’s capacities 
to protest their working conditions are only undermined. Ironically, many tourists 
dress up as smiling tea-pickers, mimicking the GI advertisements, while the workers 
have new jobs to add to their toil—posing for pictures and singing for visitors. They 
complain that the GI has “turned the plantation into a zoo”—in which they are the 
captive animals.87 
 
85. SARAH BESKY, THE DARJEELING DISTINCTION: LABOR AND JUSTICE ON FAIR-TRADE 
TEA PLANTATIONS IN INDIA 89 (2014); see also Sarah Besky, The Labor of Terroir and the Terroir of 
Labor: Geographical Indication and Darjeeling Tea Plantations, 31 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 83 (2013). 
86. BESKY, THE DARJEELING DISTINCTION, supra note 85, at 98. 
87. Id. at 111. 
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The region covered by the GI (eighty-seven colonial plantations put back into 
production) is not co-extensive with the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. In fact 
most of the same tea in this state is cultivated by Adivasis (tribal or indigenous  
peoples) who are entirely excluded from the GI’s benefits. And of course, the GI  
excludes the country of Nepal’s own smallholder cooperatives (indeed, they are seen 
as imitators from whom “the real” Darjeeling needs to be protected88). According 
to anthropologist Sarah Besky, the female tea pickers report that much of the green 
leaf that goes into the processed tea is imported in trucks that came in the night 
from Nepal and/or smuggled in from Adivasi cooperatives because it is cheaper 
and enables planters to avoid the costs mandated by India’s still minimal industrial 
labor laws.89 Nepali women smallholders’ traditional knowledge of tea cultivation 
(maintained, ironically because they were excluded from the benefits of Green 
Revolution chemical technologies), has enabled their smallholder cooperatives to 
achieve Fair Trade organic certification. The administration of this sector has also 
thereby moved into the hands of men, because local gender norms discourage 
women from dealing with foreigners.90 
The gendered and patriarchal nature of tea advertising has a long colonial  
history that appears to have been revitalized in twenty-first century Fair Trade and 
the marketing of ethically sourced products. Representations of South Asian women 
as feminine smiling workers delicately gardening pristine landscapes in Lipton  
advertising are shown by Ramamurthy to naturalize a racial hierarchy of labor in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century.91 Although such imagery declined in the 
wake of political independence from colonial power and government  
nationalizations of the industry, this “exoticized space of labour” evoking feelings 
of “environmental responsibility, romantic rural idylls, stasis and tranquility” has 
returned to grace product packaging and advertising in Fair Trade advertising.92 
How is fairness to women enhanced by denying the conditions of industrial 
plantation labor? The relationship between the commodification of colonial  
household goods for Western consumption and the rituals of colonial Asian female 
 
88. See Yogesh Pai & Tania Singla, ‘Vanity GIs’: India’s Legislation on Geographical Indications 
and the Missing Regulatory Framework, in GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF 
TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURE: FOCUS ON ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 2, at 333, 352–54 
(finding it unfortunate that cheaper (but similar quality) tea from Nepal can make its way into Indian 
markets, but taking at face value the assertion that all exported tea has a “genuineness” and 
“authenticity” that guarantees Darjeeling tea’s “untarnished reputation”). 
89. BESKY, supra note 85, at 104–05. Although we were first inclined to believe this to be mere 
rumor, we have received hearsay substantiation from several Nepalese students at York University 
whose visits home to Nepal furnished evidence that smallholders in Nepal provide much of the tea that 
is marked and marketed as Darjeeling, without receiving any of the additional value that accrues to the 
tea from this misrepresentative use of the GI. We cannot, however, verify whether this Darjeeling tea 
is sold only in domestic markets or is being exported. 
90. Debarati Sen, Fair Trade Vs. Swaccha Vyāpār: Women’s Activism and Transnational Justice 
Regimes in Darjeeling, India, 40 FEMINIST STUD. 444, 445–46, 451 (2014). 
91. Anandi Ramamurthy, Absences and Silences: The Representation of the Tea Picker in Colonial 
and Fair Trade Advertising, 13 VISUAL CULTURE BRITAIN 367 (2012). 
92. Id. at 380. 
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labor is one that has recently engaged feminist scholars who ask how multiple  
patriarchies—women’s subordination in domestic and industrial labor—continue 
to shape the hegemonic contours of the postcolonial plantation93 and neoliberal 
discourses of development.94 Historically of course, advertising has hidden or  
domesticated industrial production and women’s labor has been especially  
romanticized as emotional, rather than manual in nature; in products involving  
tropical goods from colonial contexts, however, images of manual work are more 
apparent because the natural racialization of labor in colonial social hierarchies.  
Lipton’s advertisements were the most dominant imagery of South Asians in British 
commercial culture for over a century, their contents shifting from depictions of 
plantation industrial labor to the more individuated and exoticized South Asian  
female tea plucker featured serenely at leisure in a natural environment. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, these outdoor factories had already been 
renamed as tea gardens tended by exotic and sexualized women.95 Both an exotic 
object for Western consumer consumption and “a representation of a figure that 
blurs the boundaries between consumer and laborer,”96 this serene tea picker belied 
growing struggles against colonialism in tea-growing regions. Indeed, images of  
cooperation between English homemakers and female tea workers emerged to  
symbolize a new version of Empire as a partnership of mutual benefit for Britain 
and her colonies. Always carefully surrounded by lush vegetation, the reality of the 
tea pickers’ manual labor and harsh exploitation is always hidden as consumers are 
invited to identify with her apparent ease and happiness in an attractive  
environment. Some of the most iconic imagery further domesticates her work by 
positioning her within a garden from which she offers her guest, the consumer, the 
choicest leaves.97 
Only in the twenty-first century did this gendered figure fade from 
prominence in mass-marketed tea (except on nostalgic tea tins), returning, ironically, 
in twenty-first century Fair Trade advertising designed to defetishize conditions of 
production and create solidarities between consumers and producers.98 As Kalpana 
Wilson suggests, Western charities often reproduce racialized and gendered 
hierarchies in representing the empowered agencies of workers through 
representations of their cheerful docility.99 Erasing the conditions of their lives and 
 
93. PIYA CHATTERJEE, A TIME FOR TEA: WOMEN, LABOR, AND POST/COLONIAL POLITICS 
ON AN INDIAN PLANTATION 7 (2001). 
94. Kalpana Wilson, ‘Race,’ Gender and Neoliberalism: Changing Visual Representations in 
Development, 32 THIRD WORLD Q. 315, 315–22 (2011).  
95. Ramamurthy, supra note 91, at 372. 
96. Id. at 372. 
97. Id. at 374. 
98. Id. at 375. 
99. Wilson, supra note 94. For discussions of similar imagery used in socially responsible coffee 
marketing, see Nicki Lisa Cole, Global Capitalism Organizing Knowledge of Race, Gender and Class: The 
Case of Socially Responsible Coffee, 15 RACE GENDER & CLASS 170, 170–87 (2008). For a more general 
overview of the way the so-called ‘de-fetishizing move,’ or Fair Trade, ultimately serves to fetishize 
people and places, see Matthias Zick Varul, Consuming the Campesino: Fair Trade Marketing Between 
Recognition and Romantic Commodification, 22 CULTURAL STUD. 39, 39–51 (2017). 
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livelihoods, such imagery does little to help us to understand the realities of 
plantation labor in countries where there are few forms of social security in regions 
where there are scarce options for employment. Ironically, some of today’s 
plantation workers look “back to the ‘good old days’ of colonialism when children 
were at least sent to school and health care was provided by the estate.”100 
Raju and Tiwari are rare amongst South Asian scholars because they do not 
uncritically extoll Darjeeling Tea as the first Indian GI, nor do they hold it out as a 
model for the Global South; rather they see it as paradigmatic of the failure of a 
system which has invested little in marketing, less in enforcement, and has no means 
for instituting benefit sharing. They note that not a single beneficiary has been  
registered for Darjeeling tea, even though eighty “tea gardens” are authorized to use 
it,101 showing that producers of goods have no incentive for registering as  
beneficiaries because the current legislative system has no mechanisms for sharing 
benefits with “the producer community.”102 Nonetheless, they recognize that many 
Indian regions are famous for their tea gardens and they are enthusiastic about 
regional branding as a basis for rural development.103 To the extent that they ignore 
the historical sociology of such regions, they remain blind to the ethnic, racialized, 
and gendered nature of the labor relations that constitutes these territories as such 
through their specific modes of production. The community that produces 
Darjeeling and most other tea exported from India, is constituted by hierarchically 
organized plantations on which descendants of indentured laborers, most of whom 
are women and ethnic minorities, toil under harsh conditions with little job security 
and few benefits. 
The Tea Board of India has taken few measures to insist that its logo be used 
on other brands of tea that claim to be Darjeeling. There are no mechanisms to 
ascertain if such tea comes from the demarcated region from which tea marked as 
Darjeeling must, according to the GI specifications, originate.104 Ironically,  
however, the Tea Board has filed “many cases against countries like Japan for  
registration of the Darjeeling logo mark, namely, Darjeeling women ‘serving tea/ 
coffee/coca/soft drinks/fruit juice’ in the Japanese Patent Office.”105 Similar cases 
in France, Russia, the United States, Germany, Israel, Norway, and Sri Lanka,106 
might suggest that the subservience of women is integral to the region’s brand,  
metonymically symbolized by the GI. 
 
100. Ramamurthy, supra note 91, at 378. 
101. Raju & Tiwari, supra note 28, at 295. 
102. Id. at 298. 
103. Id. at 305. 
104. Id. at 299; see also Pai & Singla, supra note 88 (relying entirely upon Tea Board claims that 
“sale-chain integrity” is indeed being maintained through their authentication processes). 
105. Raju & Tiwari, supra note 28, at 300. 
106. Id. at 298. 
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V. PLANTATION HISTORIES IN THE MAKING OF RACE, GENDER, AND 
TERRITORY 
While Darjeeling is one of the most well-known Indian GIs, it is not the only 
GI pertaining to tea in India nor is it the only tea protected by multiple MICOs.107 
Assam is another tea-growing region in which the Tea Board of India holds a GI as 
well as certification marks.108 In the nineteenth century, the Assam Valley tea  
plantations in the Northeast of India deployed the labor of over two million migrant 
laborers, workers who were held in indentured servitude well into the late twentieth 
century. Their history and continuing struggles for decent working conditions,  
access to livelihood resources, and recognition as citizens are poorly known. 
Regarded by colonial authorities as “waste land,” the Assam Valley was 
deemed ripe for English projects of improvement in the early nineteenth century. 
Planters were permitted to simply seize as much land as might be required or used 
for the development of the tea industry from 1834–1850. Formed in 1839, the 
Assam Tea Company was the world’s first, and deforested vast tracts of indigenous 
lands well into the twentieth century.109 At first local hill tribes from Upper Assam 
and plains tribes from Kachari did seasonal wage work for the company but these 
people refused regularized labor relationships. New labor sources needed to be 
found. British capitalists from the 1860s sought cheap, plentiful, and easily  
controlled people from the overtaxed tribal and dispossessed aboriginal agrarian 
communities living in less agriculturally productive regions in Bihar, Bengal, Orissa, 
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Chotanagpur who were indentured as  
coolies for industrial plantation production.110 
More than three million migrants were transported to the greater region of 
Assam between the 1860s and 1947, in conditions of generational servitude. Breach 
of the labor contract resulted in criminal prosecution; planters held extensive penal 
sanctions, including flogging for work slow-downs, strikes, and private powers of 
arrest for desertion.111 What collective resistance took place was considered 
 
107. For example, the word “Darjeeling” and the Darjeeling logo are also registered as 
certification marks. Pai & Singla, supra note 88, at 353. Darjeeling Tea is also often certified as organic 
and as Fair Trade. 
108. Biswajeet Saikia, Development of Tea Garden Community and Adivasi Identity Politics in 
Assam, 51 INDIAN J. LABOUR ECON. 307, 307–22 (2008).  
109. N.K. Das, Making Tea Tribes in Assam: Colonial Exploitation and Assertion of Adivasi 
Rights, 3 J. ADIVASI & INDIGENOUS STUD. 1, 2–3 (2016). 
110. Jayeeta Sharma, ‘Lazy’ Natives, Coolie Labour, and the Assam Tea Industry, 43 MOD. ASIAN 
STUD. 1287, 1299 (2008). Even at the time, this migration was considered coercive and abusive, 
characterized by fraud and deception on the part of recruiters. These people were just some of the 30 
million Indian migrants indentured by British capitalists in what is now understood to have replaced 
African slavery with a form of racialized oppression often referred to as a “new system of slavery.” 
RANA P. BEHAL, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SERVITUDE: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TEA 
PLANTATIONS IN COLONIAL ASSAM 4 (2014). Certainly, the region’s planters in this era readily referred 
to these workers as slaves, and there is little doubt that “the tea plantations developed a power structure 
that was much like the one that existed under slavery in American plantations in the Antebellum era.” 
Id. at 11; see also HUGH TINKER, A NEW SYSTEM OF SLAVERY: THE EXPORT OF INDIAN LABOUR 
OVERSEAS 1830–1920 (1974). 
111. Das, supra note 109, at 4. 
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individual criminal activity. The cost of transportation to the plantation was paid by 
the worker through her work, along with the cost of funerals, medicine, and 
clothing, ensuring not only that she would remain indebted for her life, but that her 
children would begin theirs saddled with their parents’ and grandparents’ debts. 
Even those with limited term contracts able to work off their debts found it 
impossible to return to their regions of origin and remained dependent upon the 
plantation economy. 
The historical organization of coolie dwellings into numbered barracks or lines 
of squalid thatched huts partitioned to hold four families, and policed by line  
managers who exercise constant surveillance over the movements of line workers 
remains the dominant principle of labor discipline today.112 Workers were  
historically locked in at night and allowed no contact with local villagers.113 Well 
into the late twentieth century, the local social structure divided tea plantations from 
the agrarian and urban social economy of Assam and its Hindu caste-based  
intelligentsia. Local peasants shunned manual labor because of its association with 
coolies, a category that was as racial as it was economic.114 The only local people 
who had any sustained contact with plantation laborers were their overseers with 
whom they had a deeply antagonistic relationship. 
Trade union interest and detailed research into these conditions of labor did 
not take place until the 1920s, when exploitation, violence, sexual abuse, illness, lack 
of literacy, and the difficulties of collective organization under plantation conditions 
were finally recognized.115 No action, however, was taken to enforce the abolition 
of planter penal authority in 1926, or to educate workers about their rights. If the 
indentured labor system formally ended in the 1920s, it continued informally for 
decades afterwards, and the tea industry’s economic success is said to be built upon 
no less than half a million violent and premature deaths.116 
With the country’s independence on the horizon, the tea industry entered into 
an agreement to ensure that the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) 
would have a monopoly over unions in the sector117 to exclude Communist-
affiliated unions. An all-Assam organization (ACMS) led by caste Hindus from 
outside the labor ranks, evolved a reputation for being soft on employers.118 More 
than half a century after independence, unions had clearly done little to provide any 
opportunities for vertical mobility or systemic change.119 
From the beginnings of the industry, women and children have made up half 
of the plantation’s workforce.120 Sexually exploited by Assam’s white masters in the 
 
112. Id. at 5. 
113. Sharma, supra note 110, at 1308. 
114. Id. at 1312. 
115. Das, supra note 109, at 7, 12–13. 
116. BEHAL, supra note 110, at 94.  
117. Sharma, supra note 110, at 1320. 
118. Id. at 1321. 
119. Id. at 1321. 
120. Id. at 1308. 
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nineteenth century, they bore the latter’s illegitimate children, and were subjected to 
sexualized forms of torture.121 The low birth and infant survival rate and high  
numbers of abortions among coolie women (a 1906 report suggested that sixty-five 
percent of pregnant women in the gardens did not give birth to live children)122 may 
have been a consequence of a lack of any maternity leave, wretched conditions for 
giving birth, and resistance to bringing up children in prevailing conditions.  
Unfortunately, it also lowered the estimation in which their morality was held by 
neighboring populations. According to a 2014 Columbia Law School Human Rights 
Institute Report, they are regularly subject to sexual harassment and subjected to 
stereotypes of tribal promiscuity.123 
Women and children were paid less than men but worked the same numbers 
of hours; moreover, female workers were assigned additional tasks such as plucking, 
a delicate and labor intensive job, which has never been considered skilled, enabling 
them to be paid as unskilled labor.124 Children, employed as casual labor well into 
the twenty-first century, were given jobs which exposed them to harmful pesticides; 
a 1992 UNICEF report found them to be doing some of the plantation’s most 
physically strenuous work.125 Women worked with their children strapped to their 
backs, nursed children in fields, and were picking tea within days or even hours after 
giving birth.126 Recent studies of contemporary labor conditions by lawyers,  
activists, and academic researchers reveal continuing patterns of racialized  
dispossession.127 Belated 1951 legislation sought to improve the living conditions 
of isolated plantation workers—outlawing child labor and restricted the hours of 
those aged twelve to seventeen, mandated provision of housing and sanitation  
facilities, potable water, subsidized food, primary schools, and hospitals, all of which 
plantation associations continue to regard as an unfair burden.128 Still, in 1990, over 
fourteen percent of the workforce, or close to one hundred thousand children,  
continued to labor on the plantations,129 and experts concede that these 1951  
provisions were ignored due to state indifference. Studies from the 1990s and 2000s 
showed that houses leaked and were not maintained, there were no toilets or bathing 
 
121. Id. at 1309.  
122. Id. at 1309 (citing ASSAM LABOUR ENQUIRY COMM., REPORT OF THE ASSAM LABOUR 
ENQUIRY COMMITTEE (1906)). 
123. Das, supra note 109, at 9. 
124. Id. at 6. 
125. VASANTHI RAMAN, CHILD LABOUR IN THE TEA PLANTATIONS OF NORTH-EAST INDIA 
(1992).  
126. BEHAL, supra note 110, at 81, 86. 
127. There are an estimated two-and-a-half million tea plantation workers in the region. Tribal 
peoples continued to be moved into the region well into the decades after World War II, and these 
peoples continued to have little or no interaction with their kin in the region from which they came. 
Contemporary wage rates in Assam are so low they would not even constitute subsistence wages for 
workers in the informal sector (which generally pays far less than formal sector employment). Indeed, 
plantation employers complain about being subject to the laws that govern organized private sector 
workers, considering the sector as properly exempt from contemporary labor relations. See Sharit  
K. Bhowmik, Living Conditions of Tea Plantation Workers, 50 ECON. & POL. WKLY., Nov. 2015, at 1–2. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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facilities, and no potable water for workers in the fields, schools were understaffed, 
badly maintained, and teachers untrained.130 High rates of illiteracy persist.131 
Conditions since the turn of the twenty-first century have actually deteriorated 
even further, as plantation closures have resulted in thousands of deaths from  
starvation, which has ensured that surviving plantations, which offer the only  
employment in these regions, are under even less pressure to meet minimal legal 
requirements.132 Surveys in 2014 found that most workers had no savings or assets, 
no housing maintenance was being performed,133 acute congestion was the norm 
and overcrowding put people at risk of respiratory problems and infectious disease, 
despite empty lands sitting idle nearby. Most plantation workers have no access to 
toilets and there are no means to supply water to the labor lines in the fields.134 In 
2016, wages were described as having “increased only nominally since 1947.”135 
With more than a million workers, the tea plantation industry is the largest in the 
formal private sector in India, yet wages are the lowest of any sector in the  
country.136 The capacity of such dispossessed and illiterate workers to organize is 
minimal, but female workers in the region of Kerala have begun to mobilize in the 
rare circumstances where workers have been made shareholders in plantation  
companies. 
Indian state neglect of plantation workers is closely related to the fact that 
most of them are from tribal communities and are still considered foreign aliens in 
the regions where they work. As we have seen, workers in Darjeeling are  
descendants of migrants from Nepal, whereas workers in Assam originate in  
Jharkand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and West Bengal. Whereas many of the tea workers 
in West Bengal are recognized as Scheduled Tribes (constitutionally recognized  
historically marginalized groups), people with similar origins are denied this status 
in Assam and designated as Other Backward Classes. Under Indian law, Scheduled 
Tribe status enables the exercise of protective discrimination and avails access to 
free education and reservation in formal employment alongside other state facilities. 
The Assamese government, dominated by caste Hindu Indian National Congress 
leaders, has refused to recognize plantation workers as having the same tribal origins 
as those of their kin who remained in West Bengal. 
Many tea workers now identify as Adivasi, or indigenous peoples, both as an 
umbrella identity under which members of different tribes can mobilize and as a 
 
130. M.A. KALAM, SHARIT K. BHOWMIK & VIRGINIUS XAXA, TEA PLANTATION LABOUR IN 
INDIA (1996). 
131. See generally Deb Nath Ruma & Nath Dipak, Educational Vulnerability and Risk Factors of 
Tea Garden Workers with Special Reference to Dewan Tea Garden Village, Cachar, Assam, India, 3 INT’L 
RES. J. SOC. SCI. 14, 14–21 (2014). 
132. Bhowmik, supra note 127, at 1–3. 
133. Id. at 2. 
134. Id. 
135. Das, supra note 109, at 7. 
136. Bhowmik, supra note 127, at 1. 
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basis to assert collective political rights.137 Despite passage of a state resolution to 
recognize “tea tribes” in 2004, the Registrar General of India denied these plantation 
workers tribal status on the basis that they did not display primitive traits, hold a 
distinctive culture, or the requisite backwardness.138 Such characteristics are 
arguably no longer descriptive of any tribes in contemporary India. Nonetheless, 
the workers’ tribal identity is contested by other recognized tribal groups who see 
plantation lands as illegally seized from indigenous peoples and who sometimes 
violently assault plantation laborers who claim Adivasi identity.139 
As we saw with the Darjeeling example, women’s subordination is not  
incidental to, but rather central to GI marketing efforts. Indeed, one symbol  
proposed for use in advertising GI protected Assam tea is a crudely racialized image 
of a woman literally in bondage to her labors: 140 
How might the adoption of a GI for Assam Tea be used as an opportunity to 
decry the exploitation endemic to this plantation sector, and put pressure upon the 
tea industry to transform conditions of production to better protect and empower 
members of the racialized and gendered minority underclass this industry has so 
 
137. If prospects for organizing workers for social change have improved in Assam, it is due 
largely to the capacities of the first generation of students to obtain secondary education, thanks to the 
introduction of Christian missionary schools in the region. Newly organized workers abandoned the 
traditional unions and established new federations in 2002, organizing workers in more than thirty 
gardens. But with tribal workers scattered across 793 registered gardens, activists have long held out 
more hope for social and economic change in workers becoming recognized as ninety-seven scheduled 
tribes who would thereby regain constitutional rights to affirmative action. Das, supra note 109, at 8. 
138. Id. at 11. 
139. Hiren Gohain, A Question of Identity: Adivasi Militancy in Assam, 42 ECON. &  
POL. WKLY. 13, 13–16 (2007). 
140.  See Tony Gebely, Tea Authenticity and Geographical Indications, WORLD TEA ( July 11, 
2016, 8:21 PM), https://worldoftea.org/tea-appellations/ [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170215124530/https://worldoftea.org/tea-appellations/]. 
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brutally created? If we regard GIs as creating a new category of public goods, it is 
imperative that the commodities which bear such GIs are produced under  
conditions that respect the human rights of those whose labor supports this  
industry. To the extent that GIs are marks communicating conditions of origin, the 
time is ripe to use the opening of new GI export markets to shame these industries 
into improving the labor and living conditions of the women whose toil brings us 
our daily tea. 
Many advocates of GIs in the Global South nonetheless look to these Indian 
tea examples as offering models for development of new GIs. For example, 
W.A.S.S. Wijesinghe and B.A.R.R. Ariyaratna see the Darjeeling Tea GI as 
providing an obvious means for Sri Lanka to protect “Ceylon Tea” and “the whole 
rural lifestyle established based on tea culture” in the hill country which “provides 
employment to over 1 million people” who “lack education and who are not skilled 
labourers.”141 Like the Darjeeling hills, this tea country might also promote regional 
tourism following the model established by European wine regions. Indeed, the Sri 
Lanka Tea Board has registered the names of its seven main tea-growing regions as  
certification marks under their Intellectual Property Act. Similarly, Naazima  
Kamardeen extolls the added protection that the Indian sui generis GI system  
(allegedly) provides as desirable for enabling better returns on trade in Sri Lankan 
tea, cinnamon, and sapphires.142 
Sri Lankan tea production has a history no more savory than Darjeeling and 
Assam. The “whole rural lifestyle established based on tea culture” features 
additional forms of exploitation that have created a contemporary underclass of 
socially marginalized and racialized peoples.143 Unable to get native Sinhalese 
peoples to submit to wage labor, mid-nineteenth century British tea plantations 
began to import workers from southern India—members of landless Tamil 
agricultural castes in the area now known as Tamil Nadu. The British paid 
middlemen—the notorious kanganies—to recruit families into gangs of indentured 
workers wholly dependent upon these overseers for credit, food, and shelter. 
Kanganies, who received wages from the planters, kept these families in perpetual 
debt, moving them from estate to estate as bonded labor. The tea plantation was a 
total institution in which captive workers were wholly isolated from surrounding 
communities who disparaged them for their ethnicity and their slave-like existence. 
Unlike the descendants of Indian Tamil peoples who arrived in the eleventh century, 
 
141. W.A.S.S. Wijesinghe & B.A.R.R. Ariyaratna, The Protection of Geographical Indications in 
Developing Countries: The Case of Ceylon Tea, 1 BALANCE – MULTIDISCIPLINARY L.J. 11 (2015). 
142. Naazima Kamardeen, The Potentials, and Current Challenges, of Protecting Geographical 
Indications in Sri Lanka, in GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND CULTURE: FOCUS ON ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 2, at 409. Although we do not 
have the space to explore conditions of production in all three areas, we would note that sapphire 
mining is an industry known for paying workers, not for the time they spend laboring, but according to 
the quality of the stones they excavate, exposing workers to poisonous gases, and continuing to use 
child labor while evading compulsory education requirements for adolescents. Cinnamon is also a 
plantation crop provided by minority groups whose labor rights appear to be unenforced. 
143.  Wijesinghe & Ariyaratna, supra note 141 at 11. 
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these “Plantation Tamil” peoples received no representation in the Sri Lankan  
Constitution of 1933. Even after independence in 1948, the plantations continued 
to be controlled by the British using despotic forms of production in which  
kanganies dominated abused workers.144 
For the surrounding Sinhalese villagers, tea plantations represented the power 
of an imperial Other perpetuating historical injustice, hostile islands of privilege and 
abuse run by white men and manned by peoples who were alien in culture and 
religion.145 Most “public utilities in the rural regions were introduced for the benefit 
of the plantations, which were resented for creating obstacles to the expansion of 
the rural agricultural economy.”146 From independence until 1972, there was  
virtually no effort to redistribute land or make plantations serve national social  
purposes or provide local benefits. The state could no longer ignore agrarian  
structures after the insurrections of 1971, deemed “the first post-independence 
armed anti-state insurgency led by radical Marxists mainly representing the rural 
subalterns.”147 Limited land reforms and a nationalization of the foreign and  
company-owned tea estates followed. Lands given to villagers, however, accounted 
for only five percent of Ceylon Tea properties; the rest were transferred to  
state-owned enterprises that continued to run large plantations staffed by the  
descendants of colonial-era coolie laborers, managed by national elites and the local 
recipients of their political patronage.148 
Plantation Tamils (sometimes called Up Country Tamils) were much better 
able to mobilize actions under these new conditions of state ownership, moving 
beyond industrial issues to make demands for citizenship. Only in the late 1980s did 
the majority of these people receive Sri Lankan citizenship, with some remaining 
stateless until 2003.149 State governments were also compelled to be more attentive 
to their needs because they wanted to prevent the spread of Tamil nationalism from 
the civil war into the plantation areas. NGO and international development funding 
pressures helped to improve conditions on plantations, provide better education 
and welfare reforms in the 1990s.150 Up Country Tamils, however, continue to live 
on the margins of Sri Lankan society, face deep-seated social prejudice and  
denigration, and endure poor sanitation, inadequate housing, and violent 
pogroms.151 Still, neither these Tamils nor their rural Sinhalese neighbors want their 
children to assume plantation employment. More and more plantation estate  
acreage has been abandoned and uncultivated due to shortages of labor, and these 
 
144. DANIEL BASS, EVERYDAY ETHNICITY IN SRI LANKA: UP-COUNTRY TAMIL IDENTITY 
POLITICS 37–38 (2013). 
145. Chandana Alawattage & Danture Wickramasinghe, Weapons of the Weak: Subalterns’ 
Emancipatory Accounting in Ceylon Tea, 22 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 379, 387 (2009). 
146. Id. (quoting Ronald Rote, A Taste of Bitterness: The Political Economy of Tea Plantations in 
Sri Lanka 266–67 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam) (on file with author)). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 388. 
149. PATRICK PEEBLES, PLANTATION TAMILS OF CEYLON 226 (2001). 
150. BASS, supra note 144. 
151. Id. 
Final to Printer_Coombe & Malik (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018 10:34 AM 
392 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:363 
new “waste lands” are now encroached upon and enclosed by smallholders who see 
themselves as exercising the rights of the rural peasantry in what local politicians 
recognize as a legitimate means to address rural poverty and unemployment. 
To what extent might the use and the benefits to be accrued by the  
deployment of the Ceylon Tea GI evolve beyond the hegemony of plantation  
industrial capitalism and its paternal and colonial forms of labor management to  
reflect this new political economy and ecology? How will an emerging class of rural 
smallholders benefit from the GI? What pressure can be put upon the government 
and the Sri Lankan Tea Board to create governance regimes for the Ceylon Tea GI 
which benefit both those whose exploited labor historically enabled this capitalist 
accumulation and those who seek new forms of rural livelihood security in the face 
of the collapse of this colonial regime of racialized labor? These are the questions 
that we might hope Asian legal scholars address rather than romanticizing such  
exploitation as a rural cultural lifestyle and endorsing the global branding of  
territories and goods that bear such extensive legacies of social injustice. 
VI. FAIR TRADE, TERRITORY, AND LABOR 
Our concerns with respect to the limitations on the governance of GIs echo 
those that now animate the critical fields of Food Studies and Fair Trade activism. 
The use of GIs with respect to tea, coffee, and other foodstuffs, like the use of 
certification labels, is a form of non-state or neoliberal agricultural governance152 
that can be repurposed to address new issues and to focus consumer attention in 
new ways.153 Consumer movements have attempted to re-embed markets that have 
become disembedded from society, bringing ethical conventions back into  
circulation to challenge dominant tendencies to treat land and labor as mere  
commodities. Arguably, the industrial production of food has become ever more 
invisible to many North American consumers for whom a pastoral ideal of family 
farming remains hegemonic. Plantations, we would venture, imaginatively belong 
for many of us to another historical era, despite the fact that they are still in  
operation throughout the world. Ethnic differences have historically shaped such 
labor systems, but “ethnicity is not an exogenous variable that can be isolated from 
class relations but rather an ongoing, dynamic process that helps constitute and  
sustain systems of exploitation, or ‘conjugated oppression.’”154 
 
152. See generally Julie Guthman, The Polanyian Way? Voluntary Food Labels as Neoliberal 
Governance, 39 ANTIPODE 456 (2007).  
153. See generally Graeme Auld, Stefan Renckens & Benjamin Cashore, Transnational Private 
Governance Between the Logics of Empowerment and Control, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 108 (2015); Valerie 
Nelson & Anne Tallontire, Battlefields of Ideas: Changing Narratives and Power Dynamics in Private 
Standards in Global Agricultural Value Chains, 31 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 481 (2014); Anne Tallontire 
et al., Beyond the Vertical? Using Value Chains and Governance as a Framework to Analyse Private 
Standards Initiatives in Agri-Food Chains, 28 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 427 (2011).  
154. Sarah Besky & Sandy Brown, Looking for Work: Placing Labor in Food Studies, 12 LABOR 19, 
37 (2015). 
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Food activism in the United States has recently “focused on improving the 
lives of a marginalized and largely immigrant workforce”155 and improving 
compensation, as part of an examination of the broader structures that govern food 
provisioning. Issues of labor are back on the table, as food activists have realized 
that their emphasis upon small farmers and socially and environmentally sustainable 
agriculture ignored the vastly greater numbers of people who produce the food we 
eat as wage laborers and migrant workers. Moving our critical gaze in this direction 
inevitably compels us to consider issues of ethnicity, race, and gender. Studies of 
food labor add important political economic dimensions to our understanding of 
commodity chains, and it is precisely such global commodity and value chains, we 
would suggest, that the GI social imaginary tends to obfuscate and that IP scholars 
should emphasize. “Global commodity chain (GCC) research has tended to focus 
on questions of governance, in terms of economic interactions between individual 
firms within a given supply chain, and the relative power of various actors to shape 
conditions of production and trade”156 while exploring agriculture as a socially 
productive process in which territorial construction and subject-making are key 
factors in production.157 Inevitably, these involve processes of racial formation. 
Critical studies of food, Besky and Brown suggest, will increasingly involve 
critical studies of labor that move beyond class to consider ethnic, gendered, and 
other forms of both oppression and collective action in particular places.158  
Significantly, they feel this is best accomplished by attention to the spatialization of  
difference in agro-food systems, which GIs, by entrenching and naturalizing  
differentiations in territory, help to effect.159 
The concept of landscape . . . [like the concept of community] functions 
through its ambiguity to naturalize and thus conceal relations of power and 
inequality. Just as landscapes obscure experiences of exploitation, 
marginality, and structural violence, so too do they conceal stories of 
solidarity and action.160 
Landscape, such as that projected by the imaginary of terroir that undergirds 
so many GI protections, must be connected to the labor processes that bring it into 
being, to expose “an ontology of labor rooted in people’s interactions with their 
material environment,” as well as the particular forms that the production of space 
assumes under capitalist modes of production.161 Landscape making is a struggle, 
to both endure and to resist exploitative conditions. It is precisely such struggles 
 
155. Id. at 19–20. 
156. Id. at 30; see generally Daniel Berliner et al., Governing Global Supply Chains: What We Know 
(and Don’t) About Improving Labor Rights and Working Conditions, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC’Y 193 
(2015). 
157. Jennifer Bair & Marion Werner, Commodity Chains and the Uneven Geographies of Global 
Capitalism: A Disarticulations Perspective, 43 ENV’T & PLAN. A 988 (2011). 
158. Besky & Brown, supra note 154, at 39. 
159. See Coombe & Aylwin, supra note 20, at 2027–30, 2038–39, for a discussion of how GIs 
function so as to constitute borders of differentiation that forge communities and identities. 
160. Besky & Brown, supra note 154, at 39. 
161. Id. at 39–40. 
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that contemporary usages of GIs tend to obscure and that critical IP scholarship 
and legal advocacy might bring to light when considering GI governance. 
During the early colonial era, tea country was considered “waste land” to be 
invested with new productivities enabled by the trade in Indian opium to Chinese 
consumers and the appropriation of Chinese tea, expertise, and labor162 to provide 
a crop that became a new stimulant and source of energy to fuel the British industrial 
working class.163 The first tea pickers were Chinese laborers recruited from the  
Singapore-Chinese labor exchange who were often kept in debt peonage ensured 
by opium addiction. Finding the Chinese too demanding of creature comforts, 
colonial officials found “the downtrodden status of the Indian . . . a virtue.”164 
Regional populations of were encouraged to migrate as families to live on 
plantations so as to provide a self-reproducing Indian workforce. 
As historical sociologist Andrew Liu explains, jungli is derived from the Hindi 
vernacular jangal, the roots of the English word ‘‘jungle.’’165 Thus, a connotation of 
wildness was inscribed upon communities searching for work during labor  
recruitment for colonial tea plantations. It indexes the construction of an essentialist 
ontology of primitiveness upon populations classified as “tribal.” Within labor  
immigration policies, administrators created typologies through which capacities for 
manual work were measured. Tribal people were viewed as most suited for the most 
physical tasks, such as the clearing of jungles and cultivation. Since nineteenth- 
century anthropology of colonial documents classified Indian tribes on the basis of 
an evolutionary telos, the local appellation jungli signified their place on this  
pragmatic telos of labor procurement and management. 
Women (and children), however, have always been numerically dominant in 
the tea fields and, in 2009, comprised half of all plantation workers and over eighty 
percent of tea pluckers on Indian plantations.166 Female plantation labor has  
historically been invested with a politically rich semiotic excess. An “iconic body of 
wildness and primitivism,” the tea pickers corporeality justifies “a civilizing and  
disciplining mission” and “lays the foundations for the elaborate and racialized  
sociology of plantation work”167 in which tea plucking is located at the farthest, 
most silent hinterland of an international chain of labor. 
The metaphors of cultivation, of gardens, and indeed of the Eden to be 
planted in the new colony create a template of colonial inscriptions about 
tea plantations in northeastern India. There was a paradise to be gained, 
new fields of endemic cultivation: of landscapes to be ‘‘settled’’ and made 
‘‘human’’ through a vision of empire and light on a ‘‘savage’’ frontier. So 
 
162. Andrew B. Liu, The Birth of a Noble Tea Country: On the Geography of Colonial Capital and 
the Origins of Indian Tea, 23 J. HIST. SOC. 73, 83, 88, 90 (2010).  
163. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN 
HISTORY 182–83 (1985). 
164. Liu, supra note 162, at 86. 
165. Id. at 80 & 94 n.33. 
166. Id. at 87.  
167. CHATTERJEE, supra note 93, at 7–8. 
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the ‘‘gardens’’ were planted, harnessing people for the hard task of 
cultivation, making an even, emerald landscape—which to this day remains 
curiously unpeopled from the distance of the road. The bushes stretch 
undulating and green, bordering the paddy fields, against the Himalayan 
foothills. The ‘‘field’’ takes on many meanings: its Cartesian emptiness to 
be explained with a corporeal history, its cartographies made temporally 
human.168 
Rather than untouched wilderness however, the tea gardens are literally manicured 
by women, whose plucking activities both enable the reproduction of the tender 
new leaves desired by tea aficionados and shape the landscape of symmetrical 
bushes that engender the region’s characteristic charms. 
Marxist discussions of value may help us to understand the relationships 
between the fetishized native women’s nimble fingers, the representation of 
industrial agricultural production as gardening, and the qualities of the territory 
thereby forged. Value is never something inherent in soil or land qualities, but is a 
socially contingent formation, belonging “to a definite historical formation of 
society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social 
character.”169 Land is a precondition for creating commodities of value, but the true 
source of such value lies in the social organization of labor: 
[T]he powers of soil were a product of history as much as nature . . . 
profitability was made possible by violent impositions of control over land, 
and the forced dispossession and discipline of people and labor. Tea 
plantations were industrial enterprises made possible by “the vast and 
uneven spatial integration of different regions into overlapping economic 
circuits” . . . plantations were and are made possible by movements more 
dynamic than a static, designated locale . . . and while they were animated 
by the specificity of local populations, climate and land, they . . . borrowed 
techniques of management, recruitment and organization from . . . around 
the globe such that [for example] Assam and tea are virtually synonymous 
but impossible to explain without considering the spatiotemporal dynamics 
of colonialism and commodity capital in nineteenth century Asia.170 
As we will explore, many peasant struggles, new social movements, alternative food 
networks, and efforts to achieve food sovereignty are now described as forms of 
decolonization,171 but Asian plantation economies are perhaps those most in need 
of decolonial strategies for reconfiguring relationships between land, labor, and 
agricultural value. 
 
168. Id. at 17. 
169. 3 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 590 (Friedrich Engels  
ed., 1894), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XB9V-X6JZ]. 
170. Liu, supra note 162, at 89–91. 
171. See generally Sam Grey & Raj Patel, Food Sovereignty as Decolonization: Some Contributions 
from Indigenous Movements to Food System and Development Politics, 32 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 431, 
439–42 (2015). 
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Recent struggles over the social organizations of labor that may be certified as 
being fair within the Fair Trade movement testify to growing public concern with 
these issues. Fair Trade certification has been the subject of a great deal of activist 
and scholarly criticism while internal conflicts about appropriate criteria for  
production have created great cleavages in the movement. Debates about the  
viability of Fair Trade production-consumption chains as a form of profit  
redistribution continue to rage. Early criticism suggested that small producers were 
subjected to great pressures in which they essentially become contract farmers with 
little autonomy in what is ultimately a buyer-driven value chain even when mediated 
by a producer’s cooperative: 
Certification standards are often the instrument of smallholders’  
dependency. They strictly define the conditions that producers need to 
meet to access Fair Trade or organic-certified markets and their premium 
prices. If the harvest is of poor quality or the need for cash is urgent, the 
producer will have to find an alternative market . . . . Qualifying for strict 
standards requires following farming practices that are generally more  
labor intensive and will produce different impacts on household  
labor . . . [forcing farmers] to comply with regulations that may be 
extremely difficult to enact locally . . . . Certification becomes a neoliberal 
governance procedure for small producers . . . and the social premium in 
Fair Trade projects can be understood as part of the neoliberal rolling out 
of the state where nongovernmental organizations projects substitute for 
government services. The debate about the status of these small-contract 
farmers reemerges. Is this a process of repeasantization, enabling autonomy 
within a high-value-added commodity chain? . . . . [D]oes the incentive to 
export-oriented production shift contract farmers away from food 
staples . . . therefore making them more vulnerable?172 
Others have focused criticism on Fair Trade marketing, which tends to  
reproduce neocolonial power relations in which white consumers are positioned as 
saviors helping producers in the Global South who are rendered as abject, needy, 
and without agency in this relationship.173 As we noted earlier, Fair Trade  
advertising is also seen as revitalizing gendered and racialized imagery of female 
subaltern plantation labor in the tea industry. 
Another response to these developments is to reject the Fair Trade binarism 
positing Southern producers and Northern consumers as discrete subject positions 
in which the development of the former is produced primarily through the agencies 
 
172. Susan Narotzky, Where Have All the Peasants Gone?, 45 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 301, 
308 (2016) (citations omitted). 
173. Ian Hussey & Joe Curnow, Fair Trade, Neocolonial Developmentalism, and Racialized Power 
Relations, 5 INTERFACE 40, 40–41, 43, 56, 59 (2013). For a discussion of this in the context of Fair 
Trade coffee, see Nicki Lisa Cole, Global Capitalism Organizing Knowledge of Race, Gender and Class: 
The Case of Socially Responsible Coffee, 15 RACE GENDER & CLASS 170 (2008), and see generally Mattias 
Zick Varul, Consuming the Campesino: Fair Trade Marketing Between Recognition and Romantic 
Commodification, 22 CULTURAL STUD. 654, 664–65. 
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of the latter and to insist instead that fairness must be attentive to local agencies in 
a place-based geopolitics of certification.174 Fair Trade certifications have operated 
as forms of neoliberal government which control farmers, subjecting them to  
enhanced forms of discipline that simultaneously binds them into a new locus of 
improvement and territorial control. Naylor, for example, insists that although  
“mediated by the market and not the state, certification remains a regulatory  
mechanism that both discursively constructs and attempts to ‘fix’ the ‘global 
south.’”175 Her criticisms, however, pertain largely to Fair Trade USA, and fail to 
address the rather significant changes taking place in Fair Trade International. 
The issue of plantation labor has become increasingly important in the  
Fair Trade movement. Historically, Fair Trade certification was “given both to  
co-operatives of small farmers and to plantations employing permanent workers” 
although there are far fewer studies of the latter.176 Fair Trade certification in  
plantation sectors historically focused on crops such as tea and bananas in which 
small farmer cooperatives were underdeveloped.177 It was, however, designed not 
for plantation owners, but for the support of landless workers. Arguably, the former 
group has received as much benefit as the latter.178 Supporters of plantation 
certification believed that it would improve labor conditions in notoriously abusive 
industries, while others doubted that such benefits would trickle down to workers. 
As Besky’s work in Darjeeling illustrated, workers often have little if any knowledge 
of Fair Trade.179 As Rie Makita explains, this is because patron-client relations 
between management and workers create relations of compliant dependency in 
which there are minimal external influences.180 Her ethnographic research found 
that even when Darjeeling tea was Fair Trade certified, workers had no knowledge 
of certification and only a vague understanding of the Joint Body (the group of 
elected worker representatives organized to use Fair Trade premiums on behalf of 
the community), often assuming that any funding must come from management.181 
 
174. Lindsay Naylor, Some Are More Fair than Others: Fair Trade Certification, Development, 
and North-South Subjects, 31 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 273, 277–78 (2014). 
175. Id. at 280. 
176. See, e.g., Sarah Besky, Colonial Pasts and Fair Trade Futures: Changing Modes of Production 
and Regulation on Darjeeling Tea Plantations, in FAIR TRADE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL 
ETHNOGRAPHIES 97, 97–122 (Sarah Lyon & Mark Moberg eds., 2010) [hereinafter Besky, Colonial 
Pasts]; Sarah Besky, Can a Plantation Be Fair? Paradoxes and Possibilities in Fair Trade Darjeeling Tea 
Certification, 29 ANTHROPOLOGY WORK REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Besky, Can a Plantation Be Fair?]; 
Ruerd Ruben & Lucie van Schendel, The Impact of Fair Trade in Banana Plantations in Ghana: Income, 
Ownership, and Livelihoods of Banana Workers, in THE IMPACT OF FAIR TRADE 137 (Ruerd Ruben  
ed., 2008). 
177. DANIEL JAFFEE, BREWING JUSTICE: FAIR TRADE COFFEE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND 
SURVIVAL 117 (2007); Marie-Christine Renard & Victor Pèrez-Grovas, Fair Trade Coffee in Mexico: At 
the Center of the Debates, in FAIR TRADE: THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSFORMING GLOBALIZATION 
138 (Laura T. Raynolds et al. eds., 2007). 
178. Renard & Pèrez-Grovas, supra note 177, at 150. 
179. Besky, Colonial Pasts, supra note 176; Besky, Can a Plantation Be Fair?, supra note 176. 
180. Rie Makita, Fair Trade Certification: The Case of Tea Plantation Workers in India, 30  
‘DEV. POL’Y REV. 87, 88–89 (2012). 
181. Id. at 103. 
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This was an impression that management had little interest in dispelling, not wanting 
premiums to be deployed to organize workers to make more demands.182 In short, 
Fair Trade premiums were used primarily to increase worker dependency by 
enhancing management patronage. 
The extension of Fair Trade certification to plantations in sectors where  
smallholder cooperatives had traditionally been the major beneficiaries created  
major cleavages in the Fair Trade movement. Many scholars have commented on 
the movement’s shift away from its original social justice orientations towards a 
primary concern with mainstream market share,183 alongside a shift from norms of 
civic partnership to those of industrial traceability coupled with growing powers of 
technical auditing that increasingly moved cost burdens onto small producers.184 
This trend may be largely explained by governance factors; for years, national 
labeling organizations were the only members of Fair Trade International and they 
sought to maximize volumes of labelled goods and the percentage of market sales.185 
Fair Trade USA and the UK Fairtrade Foundation, representing the two biggest 
certified markets, led the way in further consolidating these industrial market 
practices in the 2000s.186 Within the international system, however, European 
labeling organizations held more civic commitments and were supported by a larger 
group of civil society stakeholders.187 
One of the key areas of disagreement concerned the certification of hired  
labor enterprises; small producers and their allies barred large enterprises from most 
agricultural sectors,188 arguing that demand was insufficient to absorb existing 
farmer input and that peasants should be protected from unfair competition from 
large enterprise with respect to six commodities: coffee, cocoa, honey, sugar, rice, 
and cotton. However, labelling organizations ensured that large enterprises were 
included in all other new certified commodities.189 Most of these new 
commodities—flowers, fruits, and wine grapes—were produced by landless 
laborers on plantations, provoking demands that the organization give priority to 
improved conditions for workers and their political organization in Latin American 
 
182. Id. at 99.  
183. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bacon, Who Decides What Is Fair in Fair Trade? The Agri-
Environmental Governance of Standards, Access, and Price, 37 J. PEASANT STUD. 111 (2010); Danie Jaffee, 
Fair Trade Standards, Corporate Participation, and Social Movement Responses in the United States, 92  
J. BUS. ETHICS 267 (2012); Laura T. Raynolds, Mainstreaming Fair Trade Coffee: From Partnership to 
Traceability, 37 WORLD DEV. 1083 (2009); Marie-Christine Renard & Allison Loconto, Competing 
Logics in the Further Standardization of Fair Trade: ISEAL and the Símbolo de los Pequeños Productores, 
20 INT’L J. SOC. AGRIC. & FOOD 51 (2013). 
184. Laura T. Raynolds, Fairtrade Labour Certification: The Contested Incorporation of Plantations 
and Workers, 38 THIRD WORLD Q. 1473 (2017). 
185. Id. at 1478. For example, only at the turn of the twenty-first century did producer groups 
and their social movement allies push the Fair Trade Organization to adopt multi-stakeholder 
governance and add a few trader and producer groups to the Executive Board, who were still a minority. 
186. Id. at 1480.  
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1482.  
189. Id. at 1480–81.  
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banana, African flower, and Asian tea production particularly.190 Fair Trade USA’s 
desire to expand to garment manufacturing stretched stakeholder resistance to a 
breaking point, particularly when certified athletic balls were shown to have been 
produced by child labor in factories that failed to pay minimum wages in 2010.191 
The breakaway of Fair Trade USA in order to independently certify plantations in 
all agricultural and marketing sectors was the inevitable collapse of long-standing 
fissures in the movement.192 
One very important consequence of this rupture was the opportunity to  
solidify the rights of workers and centralize the significance of labor standards in 
Fair Trade International. As Raynolds recounts, not only has the International  
Executive now given producers as many board seats as labelling groups, but traders 
are no longer represented there, and farmers, workers, and their allies now voice 
specific regional concerns.193 Trade union representatives have been finally given a 
voice. Since 2010, a Workers’ Rights Advisory Council has encouraged stronger ties 
with unions and workers’ rights organizations, bringing them into review of central 
policy. The 2012 New Workers’ Rights Strategy rejects models of corporate social 
responsibility and auditing models to stress initiatives that empower workers to  
affect the decisions that have the greatest impact on their lives. Fair Trade  
International now sees itself as having an obligation to create the conditions under 
which workers negotiate their own working conditions.194 
In formulating its new criteria, Fairtrade also solicited input from certified 
plantation and factory managers, distributors and national labelling  
initiatives, as well as NGO and union stakeholders. The revised ‘Fairtrade 
Standard for Hired Labour’ was approved by the Board in 2013 with near 
unanimous support . . . [to] incorporate two foundational labour advocacy 
and union demands. First, while certification has always required paying 
minimum wages, Fairtrade’s new standards require payment of ‘living 
wages’, acknowledging that minimum wages often do not ensure a decent 
standard of living. And, second, while Fairtrade has always required that 
workers be democratically organised, its new standards require proactive 
support for unionisation, recognising unions as the most legitimate form 
of worker representation.195 
There is also evidence to suggest that Fair Trade International is becoming 
more sensitive to local conditions and supportive of local social justice initiatives. 
For example, April Linton shows that in the South African wine industry Fair Trade 
International has negotiated certification standards to foster greater racial and  
 
190. Id. at 1482.  
191. Id. at 1484.  
192. Laura T. Raynolds, Fair Trade: Social Regulation in Global Food Markets, 28 J. RURAL 
STUD. 276 (2012). 
193. Id. at 282. 
194. Id. at 288. 
195. Id. at 289 (internal citations omitted). 
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gender equities and address biodiversity conservation concerns.196 In other words, 
fairness has been interpreted to take account of the particular histories of apartheid 
and its environmental legacies such that the Fair Trade label “means that it was 
produced according to South African rules that aim to promote social 
transformation.”197 Similarly, Makita shows that in nine Darjeeling tea plantations, 
independent NGOs now manage premiums to ensure more equitable distributions 
that fulfill community needs; the Community Health Advancement Initiative 
(CHAI), for example, has assisted workers in using the premium to build roads and 
sanitation facilities, provide health care, and establish community centers.198 Both 
instances illustrate that MICOs are capable of evolving so as to pluralize governance 
structures to meet local social justice needs grounded in human rights concerns. 
They thereby bring principles of rights-based development to bear upon GI  
governance. 
Let us return to Naylor’s criticisms of Fair Trade USA—criticisms that can 
“be used to re-imagine systems of trade . . . not trapped in an economic system 
dictated by a nebulous ‘[N]orth’ and made available to a faceless ‘[S]outh’” and  
enable us to “think differently about certification outside of the north–south  
framing and neoliberal economic imaginaries.”199 As an example, she points to an 
independent movement on the part of small producers in Latin America to create 
an alternative “small producers’ symbol” (Símbolo de los Pequeños Productores—
SPP) to mark goods as having their origins in conditions that promote fairness  
according to local norms and values that are more sensitive to the pressures that  
producers face. This system of producer-led standards began certifying groups in 
2011. This regionally based movement focused on using existing, place-based  
production systems to create networks of exchange grounded in social relationships 
that strengthened solidarity networks which added value locally and supported more 
dignified forms of livelihood.200 Practitioners thereby perform “economic identities 
that are focused on place-based ways of living.”201 This political and economic  
emphasis, we will suggest, informs many new uses of GIs and other MICOs  
evolving in the wake of agricultural crises, peasant politicization, and consumer  
concerns about food security in many regions of the world. 
 
196. April Linton, Growing Fair Trade in South Africa, 9 GLOBALIZATIONS 725 (2012). 
197. Id. at 726.  
198. Makita, supra note 180, at 102–04. 
199. Naylor, supra note 174, at 280; see also Cheryl McEwan et al., Fairtrade, Place and Moral 
Economy: Between Abstract Ethical Discourse and the Moral Experience of Northern Cape Farmers, 49 
ENV. & PLAN. A 572 (2017). 
200. Renard & Loconto, supra note 181; see generally Ronald Nigh & Alma-Amalia González 
Cabañas, Reflexive Consumer Markets as Opportunities for New Peasant Farmers in Mexico and France: 
Constructing Food Sovereignty Through Alternative Food Networks, 39 AGROECOLOGY & SUSTAINABLE 
FOOD SYSTEMS 317 (2015). 
201. Naylor, supra note 174, at 281. 
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VII. PLACE-BASED ECONOMIES AND BIOCULTURAL DIVERSITY: SECOND AND 
THIRD GENERATION MARKS INDICATING CONDITIONS OF ORIGIN (MICOS) 
Neoliberal pressures such as market-led agrarian forms, foreign land grabs, 
new enclosures, and the associated intensification of monocropping in new  
plantation sectors such as horticulture, soya, and oil palm, have catalyzed a growing 
transnational peasant movement with new emphasis on supporting farmer 
autonomy, agroecology, and alternative food networks.202 Under conditions of  
increasingly detrimental market dependence, efforts to secure greater autonomy in 
agriculture and food production more generally have become increasingly  
politicized. New forms of MICOs and related certifications are emerging from  
efforts to integrate people’s agricultural work into circuits of value accumulation in 
ways which prevent the subsumption of their labors into total proletarianization and 
give them greater control over the conditions of their livelihood. 
Significantly, “[t]ransnational social movements such as [La] Vía Campesina 
have focused on peasants’ agency to secure land rights and food sovereignty,”  
emphasizing peasant identification with land and embeddedness in local  
communities,203 while making peasants “interlocutors and rights-bearing claimants 
in international institutions.”204 Thus, the rhetoric of community land-attachment 
and territorial identification may be put to new uses in contemporary political  
struggles as land-based peoples strive to simultaneously maintain livelihoods and 
make a living in conditions under which neither autonomous subsistence nor total 
proletarianization (or contract farming when even the security of proletarianization 
is no longer available) provide adequate forms of economic or food security. 
Agroecological projects have been defined as a new “rural development 
paradigm” and are often related to food sovereignty movements. They 
differ from Fair Trade and organic-certified agriculture because they are 
embedded in local knowledge paradigms and eschew monocrop and export 
agriculture in favor of short-circuit biodiverse agricultural systems. These 
projects are oriented toward re-embedding food production in local 
territories by strengthening knowledge links and responsibilities between 
producers and consumers. Although they are generally presented as 
grassroots movements that claim power to reorganize food provisioning, 
they are often supported by regional, national, or supranational  
institutions.205 
Agroecology movements generally oppose Green Revolution technologies 
and biotechnological inputs into agriculture which make farmers dependent upon 
 
202. Narotzky, supra note 172. 
203. Id. at 304–05. 
204. Id. at 305 (citing Marc Edelman & Carwil James, Peasants’ Rights and the UN System: 
Quixotic Struggle? Or Emancipatory Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 81 (2011)) (it 
should be noted that this subject position is not necessarily limited to rural areas, but may also 
encompass landless urban dwellers).  
205. Id. at 308–09. 
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transnational corporations. Instead, they support family subsistence, care of the 
environment, and a more craftsman-like approach to food production and may also 
rely upon higher-value added returns through niche product markets.206 Unlike 
conventional GI strategies, however, agroecology movements are also invested in 
the use, development, mobilization and sharing of traditional knowledge, 
biodiversity conservation and enhancement, the revitalization of small markets, 
protection of rural employment and support for women’s farming activities. 
Such projects in the Global South are often modeled on what we will call  
second-generation MICOs, developed in Europe to further rural development  
initiatives that aim to fulfill a broader range of social objectives than conventional 
consumer-oriented certifications. They “depend on creating consumer–producer 
alliances through cooperatives that seek to avoid intermediaries in the food chain” 
often involving producer-consumer networks and participatory guarantee systems 
to “bypass third-party certification pressures.”207 Often described as alternative 
food networks or food activism,208 these practices of relocalization make new uses 
of Protected Designation of Origin in the European context and suggest new uses 
for GIs that might also support emergent solidarity economies. 
Before dismissing all European solutions as suspect due to their metropolitan 
or colonial provenance, we might reflect that regions in the European rural South, 
like many rural districts in South Asia, have recently faced protracted crises in  
commercial agriculture and food provisioning. As Cristina Grasseni’s ethnographic 
study of Gruppo di Acuisto Solidale (GAS or solidarity purchase group) networks in 
southern Italy clearly illustrates, alternative food networks are increasingly  
normalized for lower-middle class families in Southern European regions facing a 
credit crunch, recession, or austerity measures.209 No longer niche or alternative, 
buying collectively from nearby producers has become an increasingly necessary 
everyday practice in which new territorial communities are forged. Revitalising  
traditional knowledges, reintroducing local cultivars, and organizing fairs and  
festivals of products in short food chains, such provisioning activities increasingly 
combine economic, environmental, and human rights concerns as well as new forms 
of conviviality.210 
 
206. See generally J.D. VAN DER PLOEG, THE NEW PEASANTRIES: STRUGGLES FOR 
AUTONOMY AND SUSTAINABILITY IN AN ERA OF EMPIRE AND GLOBALIZATION (2008). 
207. Narotzky, supra note 172, at 309. 
208. See, e.g., FOOD ACTIVISM: AGENCY, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMY (Carole Counihan & 
Valeria Siniscalchi eds., 2014); FOOD FOR CHANGE: THE POLITICS AND VALUES OF SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS ( Jeff Pratt & Pete Luetchford eds., 2014); Marco Pitzallis & Filippo M. Zerilli, Giardiniere 
Inconsapevole: Pastori Sardi, Retoriche Ambientaliste e Strategie di Riconversione, 6 CULTURE DELLA 
SOSTENIBILITÀ 149 (2013). 
209. CRISTINA GRASSENI, BEYOND ALTERNATIVE FOOD NETWORKS: ITALY’S SOLIDARITY 
PURCHASE GROUPS (2013). 
210. Issues of equity incite purchasers to put emphasis upon women’s, children’s, and 
Indigenous Peoples’ interests as producing groups. Id. at 5.  
Final to Printer_Coombe & Malik (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018 10:34 AM 
2018] WORK OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 403 
In the province of Bergamo, Italy, Grasseni explores “a veritable reinvention 
of local food systems”211 by sixty-two GASs that brought a critical political edge to 
local food politics. The region had already established various MICOs for prodotti 
tipici protected through GIs such as denominations of origin as well as Slow Food 
certifications to add value to foods marketed as heritage goods.212 “[I ]n the face of 
the socioeconomic challenges presented by deindustrialization, food desertification, 
and the pauperization of the urban working classes,” new socioeconomic projects 
of territorialization were forged.213 The predominant class dimensions of social  
relations of consumption of organic, regional, local and typical or traditional goods 
that rely upon the territorial valorization of a “‘market-oriented developmental  
imaginary’” (such as those promoted by most proponents of GIs) may be  
overturned, Grasseni shows, when consumers and producers forge collaborative 
networks.214 Rather than “envisioning the local as a mythical locus of resistance to 
capitalistic globalization,” or viewing “locality and community as symbolic  
investments,” these new networks addressed issues of inequality and dispossession. 
They did so in a context where organizations like Slow Food, which valorized  
artisanal, niche, and authentic traditional goods were seen as “yet another form of 
urban domination over rural food systems, social organization and symbolic  
capacities”215 that failed to address producer and consumer needs. 
Not only were the farmers in these efforts not reduced to recipients of  
paternalistic charity, but they rearticulated the rhetorical tropes of food heritage and 
locality—the province of conventional GI marketing materials—to reconfigure  
unequal partnerships between peasants, certification authorities, and consumer 
groups. For example, the marginalized rural territory of Val Brembana sought to 
mark itself as a solidarity economy district as a potential alternative to wage labor in 
the face of declining local manufactures and luxury export brands (such as San  
Pellegrino water) which, like other GIs, provided few widespread local benefits: 
Despite the fact that local cheeses had gained several denominations  
of protected origin, and that about 3,500 individuals were registered 
farmers, it turned out that only about 200 had commercial milk quotas, 
which meant that all the others were not authorized to sell milk.  
Few orchards and fields were cultivated . . . . Networking appeared 
fraught . . . . Training and cooperative leadership had to be provided and 
 
211. Id. at 12. 
212. CRISTINA GRASSENI, THE HERITAGE ARENA: REINVENTING CHEESE IN THE ITALIAN 
ALPS (2017); Cristina Grasseni, Reinventing Food: The Ethics of Developing Local Foods, in ETHICAL 
CONSUMPTION: SOCIAL VALUE AND ECONOMIC PRACTICE 198 ( James G. Carrier & Peter  
G. Luetchford eds., 2012); Cristina Grasseni, Resisting Cheese: Boundaries, Conflict and Distinction at the 
Foot of the Alps, 15 FOOD CULTURE & SOC’Y 23 (2012); Cristina Grasseni, Reinventing Food: Alpine 
Cheese in the Age of Global Heritage, 8 ANTHROPOLOGY FOOD 1, 1 (2011). 
213. GRASSENI, supra note 209, at 19–20. 
214. Id. at 20 (citing David Goodman, Place and Space in Alternative Food Networks: Connecting 
Production and Consumption, in CONSUMING SPACE: PLACING CONSUMPTION IN PERSPECTIVE 194 
(Michael K. Goodman, David Goodman & Michael Redclift eds., 2012)). 
215. Id. at 26. 
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built. Local entrepreneurs and stakeholders had to be mapped. However, a 
number of projects had already focused on sustainable agriculture for 
cultural tourism or food heritage projects . . . . [and] activists counted on 
local smallholders, breeding farm animals on free-range pastures or 
cultivating organic vegetables, to initiate short supply chains.216 
A dedicated group of consumers built a sustainable purchase group to enable these 
and future smallholders to move beyond self-sufficiency and place surplus goods in 
local markets. This, Grasseni shows, was just one of many “concurrent strategies of 
food relocalization and reterritorialization” based upon “renewed interest in local 
food as a resource for development and sometimes for territorial marketing.”217 
As Grasseni astutely recognizes, “[T]he scenario of marginalized agriculture 
de facto sustains both elitist food practices and grassroots food activism, with 
significant overlaps and sometimes collaboration”218 but the two agendas are 
distinct. Solidarity economies are grassroots efforts to shape ecologies and build 
markets in which new purchasing, distribution, and pricing models supplement  
cooperative production and a revitalization of traditional crops in self-conscious 
exercises of food sovereignty. In this way, they are quite distinct from more  
conservative projects that valorize and market locality, authenticity, territorial  
identity, and food heritage but do nothing to preserve agricultural land, decrease 
food prices for lower income consumers, fairly allocate risks between consumers 
and producers, or provide guaranteed markets and social supports for bakers and 
other food artisans.219 These economic experiments are part of a larger movement 
in the European rural hinterlands and its urban/rural interfaces, which—running 
parallel to agroecology movements in the Global South—are based on the premise 
that agricultural modernization and its lack of sustainability are “the opposite of 
rural development,” which must emphasize “not only quality food but also the  
social reproduction of the farm itself.”220 
Unlike many Italian GI schemes that “rely upon the attractiveness of local 
foods to introduce a number of typical products based on the premise that each 
locality should market a suitably varied palette of products that are indicative of the 
singularities of the land and the agricultural tradition of that specific territory, 
hoping that this will be rewarded in the market,” alternative provisioning networks 
“rethink and reweave the economic fabric.” 221 They position consumers as active 
workers in the maintenance of rural producers’ economic security, supporting 
independent farmers’ cooperatives which pledge respect for land quality as well as 
 
216. Id. at 35. 
217. Id. at 36. 
218. Id. at 38. 
219. Id. at 40–41. 
220. Id. at 42 (citing JAN DOUWE VAN DER PLOEG, OLTRE LA MODERNIZZAZIONE: PROCESSI 
DI SVILUPPO RURALE IN EUROPA (2006); Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, Diversita Delle Forme di Impresa 
e Sviluppo Rurale, in BIODIVERSITÀ E TIPICITÀ: PARADIGMI ECONOMICI E STRATEGIE COMPETITIVE 
184 (Gianluca Brunori ed. 2007)). 
221. Id. at 46. 
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workers’ rights. Such efforts have also attracted the energies of Catholic and 
communist workers’ associations, environmentalists, and conservation and 
agricultural park advocates and managers.222 Solidarity purchase groups are heavily 
staffed by women, whose efforts account for their exponential growth during the 
austerity years of 2010–2012. In addition to revitalizing traditional cultivars and 
food preparation practices, they have been influential in liberating at least some food 
supplies from mafia-ridden distribution chains, and the exploitative immigration 
practices, slave-like labor, toxic waste disposal practices, and land degradation with 
which the mafia is closely associated. Such ethnographic studies clearly indicate that 
issues of food security and sovereignty are not limited to farmers, artisans, and 
indigenous peoples in the Global South but increasingly engage wider networks of 
consumers and producers seeking new ways of fulfilling livelihood and 
environmental needs. 
Ethnographic work from southern India also shows how alternative  
agricultures are emerging amongst smallholders in response to an epidemic of 
farmer suicides marking an economic and environmental crisis in the region caused 
by debt and the externalities of the Green Revolution.223 Like their Italian  
counterparts, Indian farmers, smallholders, and consumers seek to find supports 
for greater self-determination and resilience in agricultural livelihoods as well as 
greater human and environmental health. If some have migrated to engage in  
export-oriented ginger cultivation, others have converted to organic agriculture, 
while still others have become adherents of Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF), 
which shares many attributes with agro-ecological movements for peasant  
autonomy around the world.224 ZBNF emerged as a grassroots experiment in  
reterritorialization that shifted relations between humans, animals, soils, and 
 
222. Id. at 58. 
223. See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ZERO BUDGET NATURAL 
FARMING IN INDIA (2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-bl990e.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ49-7M4V]; 
Niloshree Bhattacharya, Food Sovereignty and Agro-Ecology in Karnataka: Interplay of Discourses, 
Identities, and Practices, 27 DEV. PRAC. 544, 548 (2017); Ashlesha Khadse et al., Taking Agroecology to 
Scale: The Zero Budget Natural Farming Peasant Movement in Karnataka, India, 32 J. PEASANT  
STUD. 1, 7 (2017); Srijit Mishra, Risks, Farmers’ Suicides and Agrarian Crisis in India: Is There a Way 
Out?, 63 INDIAN J. AGRIC. ECON. 38 (2008); B.B. Mohanty, ‘We Are Like the Living Dead’: Farmer 
Suicides in Maharashtra, Western India, 32 J. PEASANT STUD. 243 (2005); Vamsi Vakulabharam, 
Agrarian Crisis in India, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 300 (2013) (finding over a quarter of a million Indian 
farmers have committed suicide in the last two decades according to La Via Campesina). In its report, 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations explains that Post-Green Revolution 
Indian farmers’ movements have been concerned with issues of pricing, the environmental degradation 
of monocropping, water and electricity use, farmer indebtedness and dependency and draw from 
Gandhian ideologies of self-reliance, self-respect, satyagraha (freedom to save seeds) and nonviolence. 
They have protested genetically modified seeds, multinational corporate dominance of agricultural 
inputs, and global trade-based intellectual property requirements with respect to plant breeders’ rights 
and genetic patenting. Many of these farmers’ movements attempted to unite peasants across class and 
caste differences against exploitation and dependency. 
224. See Daniel Munster, Agro-Ecological Double Movements? Zero Budget Natural Farming and 
Alternative Agricultures After the Neoliberal Crisis in Kerala, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AGRARIAN 
TRANSITION: INDIA IN THE GLOBAL DEBATE 223–24 (B.B. Mohanty ed., 2016).  
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markets, by increasing humus creation in the soil through biodynamic fertilization 
processes and intercropping to reduce needs for external inputs. 
As Munster’s ethnographic work in Kerala revealed, the options facing  
smallholders were limited; export-oriented chemical farming of new crops such as 
ginger, involved speculative investments by farmers in distant fields, which were 
quickly depleted with the same chemicals that had already destroyed their local 
lands. Transitioning to organic agriculture was merely another means of becoming 
dependent upon expensive and external inputs to soil quality, subject to external 
auditing, and tethered to an exclusive set of export crops that did not meet local 
subsistence needs.225 In the face of these alternatives, ZBNF became immensely 
popular. Originally developed by Subhash Palekar as a means to address negative 
Green Revolution effects on his own family farm and drawing upon his extensive 
research on indigenous farming ecologies as an extension officer,226 the practice is 
now taught at massive training camps across the country. It has evolved from a 
toolkit of farming techniques into a peasant-driven social movement,227 albeit one 
with little formal organization. ZBNF became widespread in Karnataka when it was 
adopted by Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRSS), one of the most visible La Via 
Campesina (LVC) member organizations in South Asia.228 The practice has spread 
primarily through campesino-to-campesino horizontal learning models (first 
adopted in Cuba) based in farmer training schools such as Amrita Bhoomi, the first 
LVC school of agroecology in South Asia. ZBNF insists upon maintaining farmer 
autonomy and building upon traditions of local knowledge specific to communities 
of practice such as methods of making manure, revival of local earthworms, use of 
natural insecticides, rainwater conservation, and productive forms of 
intercropping.229 Such activities enhance soil conditions, diversify local genetic 
resources, and minimize loss of energy, water, and nutrients.230 
 
225. Id. at 232 (describing that, for most ZBNF practitioners, organic farming is too similar to 
chemical farming in making smallholders dependent upon agri-business companies who control organic 
inputs); see also Bhattacharya, supra note 223, at 549. 
226. See Khadse et al., supra note 223. Many have remarked that Palekar’s own philosophy of 
ZBNF—which evokes mother earth and the Goddess Anapurna, in which the native cow is holy and 
the practice draws from Vedas and recovers a Hindu national past—echoes right-wing Hindutva 
ideology and fundamentalism. Still, ethnographic evidence suggests that ZBNF is accepted by farmers 
not because of any underlying ideology but because of the practical success of its techniques in 
increasing farmer security, producing greater yields of multiple crops, reducing costs and providing 
greater dignity and autonomy to smallholders. Many adopt just some ZBNF techniques to combine with 
other natural practices. Some farmers claim that such natural farming techniques are part of a much longer 
heritage; certainly Gandhian and Lohiate ideologies also support these methods, as do the politics of food 
sovereignty and the science of agroecology. In any case, Palekar does not seem to discriminate in 
promoting ZBNF, nor is he known to use any ethnic rhetoric in his agricultural promotions. 
227. See Khadse et al., supra note 223. 
228. See Bhattacharya, supra note 223, at 546. 
229. See R. YOGANANDA BABU, ACTION RESEARCH REPORT ON SUBHASH PALEKAR’S  
ZERO BUDGET NATURAL FARMING (2008), http://www.atimysore.gov.in/pdf/action_research.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LK8-RD6P] (providing a detailed overview of the various techniques that may be 
involved); Khadse et al., supra note 223, at 10–12. Dozens of demonstrations are also available on YouTube. 
230. See Khadse et al., supra note 223, at 10. 
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In Karnataka, the movement’s capacity to support poor peasants from lower 
castes is still limited due to transition costs (particularly access to a cow) and because 
moneylenders seek to make their clients dependent upon their own supply of seeds 
and fertilizers.231 Until the costs of obtaining and keeping local cows can be lowered, 
subsidized, or socialized, there will be significant barriers to smallholders in India. 
Nonetheless, caste solidarity across social class and KRSS political solidarity with 
lower class Dalits appears to be bringing small and marginal farmers into the  
movement. Women and youth attend training camps in high numbers and  
participate in on-farm ZBNF activities; Amrita Bhoomi has made women’s 
leadership training a priority.232 
Farmers using the method or some combination of its techniques report relief 
from debt, more security, abundant yields, higher and more stable net incomes,  
better soil conditions, more attractive produce, greater genetic diversity, reduced 
vulnerability to pests and pathogens, less need for water and labor, and improved 
family health.233 ZBNF now has adherents in most Indian states, achieving scale in 
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh as well as Kerala and Karnataka (where it is  
estimated to be used by 100,000 farmer families; Munster reports that Palekar claims 
30 million practitioners234). Its adoption and support by LVC, however, promises 
to make it even more widely known. With the support of the International Food 
Security Network (co-funded by the Council of Europe) and the Asia Food Security 
Network, LVC brought farmers, researchers, and scholars from Bangladesh,  
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Indonesia, Thailand, Tanzania, 
and even Puerto Rico and Spain to learn the technique and to spread their 
knowledge of it through their own national movements, schools, and communities 
in an agroecology training event in late 2015.235 
Marketing remains a particular challenge for scaling up ZBNF; “many farmers 
sell their natural produce as if it were chemically grown, to private traders or at 
government wholesale yards” with no price premium because differentiated 
marketing opportunities are scant.236 “Other farmers rely on their own local 
marketing networks, such as [specific] organic shops and individual customers.”237 
Most other agroecology production processes rely upon local and favorable 
markets, in which networks of consumers and producers provide supports. Various 
cooperatives, crowdsourcing, social entrepreneurial initiatives, and trusts have 
 
231. See Bhattacharya, supra note 223, at 551–52. 
232. See Khadse et al., supra note 223, at 9; No Revolution Without Women: Karnataka Women 
Making Inroads into the Farmers Movement, LA VIA CAMPESINA S. ASIA BLOG (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://lvcsouthasia.blogspot.com/2016/10/no-revolution-without-women.html [https://perma.cc/ 
32L3-N3FM]. 
233. See Khadse et al., supra note 223; Munster, supra note 224, at 237. 
234. See Munster, supra note 224, at 234.  
235. See INT’L FOOD SEC. NETWORK & ASIA FOOD SEC. NETWORK, INTERNATIONAL 
FARMERS’ AGROECOLOGY TRAINING (2015). 
236. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 223, at 4. 
237. See Id. at 1–4.  
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begun marketing projects for ZBNF.238 Since winning the prestigious civilian award 
Padma Shi from the national government in 2016, Palekar has become more 
influential. In a May 2017 Times of India interview, he proclaimed ZBNF to be the 
future of agriculture for the country, and in June 2017 he became advisor to the 
Andhra Pradesh state government on natural farming.239 Authorities have 
encouraged Palekar to use video-conferencing to further expand his already 
considerable social media following and invited him to launch a new agriculture 
university focusing on natural farming.240 It seems highly likely that new forms of 
certification will be designed for ZBNF agricultural goods in the near future. 
Palekar has long anticipated a parallel certified market in which local NGOs develop 
their own certification marks to indicate to consumers that foods have been 
produced entirely from farm-based resources without external outputs.241 Given 
that the indicia for goods grown in accordance with these principles have already 
been established, a certification scheme could provide them with added value at 
little cost,242 a prospect that seems more probable with new administrative supports. 
Multilateral institutions, transnational environmental and human rights 
NGOs, and organized indigenous peoples and peasant social movements such as 
ZBNF are also promoting new certifications for goods as well as eco-services 
derived from practices of preserving what is now known as biocultural diversity.243 
Emphasizing the interconnectedness of biological and cultural manifestations of 
livelihoods, biocultural diversity is a principle that recognizes the co-production of 
nature, culture, and knowledge. For example, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED), an environmental NGO working with a 
regional indigenous organization, Association Andes, has been influential in 
convincing UN agencies of the importance of supporting, recognizing, and finding 
new means to mark and to market goods and services produced in accordance with 
customary legal principles that maintain biocultural diversity and indigenous 
livelihoods.244 They promote the development of a Biocultural Heritage Indication 
 
238. Jabir Mushthari, Natural Farm Products Get Boost with New Project, HINDU (Aug. 12, 
2015), http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/new-project-to-ensure-steady-market-in-
kozhikode/article7528669.ece [https://perma.cc/ARC6-X7MB] (“‘Vithu Muthal Vipani Vare 
Vishudhi’ [was] launched by Earth Care Foundation to ensure maximum price for farmers and toxin-
free food for consumers.”). 
239. See M.N. Samdanil, Subhash Palekar Appointed Govt Advisor on Natural Farming, TIMES 
INDIA, June 14, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/vijayawada/subhash-palekar-appointed-
govt-advisor-on-natural-farming/articleshow/59148594.cms [https://perma.cc/67AP-KK26]. 
240.  See Munster, supra note 224, at 240 (citing SUBHASH PALEKAR, FIVE LAYER PALEKAR 
MODELS: MIXED LASHYADHISHA PATTERN (2010)). 
241. Id. 
242. Teshager W. Dagne, Harnessing the Development Potential of Geographical Indications for 
Traditional Knowledge-Based Agricultural Products, 53 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y 441 (2010); Ranjan 
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labelling scheme, like Fair Trade or Slow Food designations based, for example, 
upon the collective trademark that Potato Park communities in Peru have 
established.245 They have employed sympathetic IP scholars (e.g., Graham 
Dutfield) and social movement lawyers (e.g., those working with the NGO Natural 
Justice) to deliberate on the prospects that common law marks hold for community 
use, sharing these experiences with communities in Africa, Asia, and Canada. Most 
recently, they have attracted the support of the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) consultative body responsible for managing natural 
heritage areas, cultural landscapes, and newly recognized indigenous and 
community conserved areas. A biocultural labelling system would create MICOs 
rooted in international environmental, heritage, and indigenous human rights 
principles.246 
Such third generation biocultural MICOs aim to merge added value through 
marketing with the protection of biocultural diversity to promote rural 
development.247 Traditional crops and foods grown in biologically diverse 
landscapes are valorized as candidates for bearing new green certifications that mark 
the role of environmentally sustainable cultivation methods. Goods originating in 
India’s Western Ghats mountain range are candidates. The district of Kodagu, also 
known as Coorg, produces one third of India’s coffee primarily cultivated by the 
Kodava community.248 In 2008, Conservation International recognized the Western 
Ghats as a biodiversity hotspot, one of only thirty-six in the world.249 Smallholder 
coffee cultivation within forests and protected areas has substantially increased since 
1977.250 The Kodava are the primary landowning group in the district whose 
“customs and traditions have historically shaped, and continue to shape, landscape 
evolution in the district.”251 With cultural traditions closely linking ancestral worship 
to nature, they maintain sacred groves in their natural state amid the coffee 
plantations. They typically express a positive attitude towards biodiversity 
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conservation on their estates, which are governed by traditional management 
institutions. 
Some of Kodagu’s lush forest areas have been converted to coffee plantations, 
although this has not impacted original forest tree cover in a significantly 
detrimental manner. Still, there is a desire to slow this biodiversity loss in light of 
the region’s overall richness. Garcia and her coauthors note that the forests  
“provide a series of environmental services in terms of pollination, carbon 
sequestration, and water recharge that the scientific community is only now starting 
to assess,”252 while Neilson and Pritchard suggest that “the integrity of the 
biodiversity values of Kodagu [may be] dependent on the enrolment of coffee 
planters as environmental stewards.”253 Eco-certification labelling in the Indian 
coffee sector is a recent phenomenon, premised upon rewarding coffee growers for 
biodiversity conservation.254 The CAFNET project was introduced in Kodagu in 
2011 to help farmers document biodiversity on their farms, inventorize their 
management practices, and organize their internal record keeping systems.255 Their 
existing agricultural practices already met the project’s environmental standards. 
The effort addressed some of the shortcomings of an earlier failed Coorg Orange 
GI, in which the GI specifications failed to consider biodiversity or to build 
awareness among local farmers of the environmental services provided by the 
landscape and the product.256 Eco-labelling standards from global certification 
bodies typically apply standard environmental criteria with little regard for local 
contexts’ Global systems of certification, Neilson and Pritchard argue, must be 
modified so as to be flexibly recalibrated to local ecosystems, the needs of local 
producers and sensitivity to local institutions. Coorg coffee production actually 
required higher standards to guarantee greater environmental sustainability. 
Considering local specificities may also enable attention to a wider range of 
social impacts and benefits tethered to biocultural preservation.257 The Kodagu 
agrocoffee sector, for instance, could adapt initiatives applied to aid smallholders in 
the Nilgiris tea industry in the Tamil Nedu region, such as the Quality Upgradation 
Programme (QUP).258 Initiated by a governmental agricultural research agency to 
improve the position of smallholders in tea value chains, the QUP sought market 
based solutions through an improved product that could fetch higher prices, rather 
than state intervention via subsidies. Growers were trained in leaf quality and 
established Quality Tea Procurement Centers led by village-based women’s self-
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help groups.259 These groups act as “community-based institutions for revolving 
credit and for the financing of small-scale entrepreneurial activities,” assisted by 
NGOs in enhancing their financial and management organization towards 
articulating and fulfilling collective community responsibilities.260 Such enterprises 
may empower the most marginalized groups in value chains by integrating local 
objectives and values into biocultural heritage certification schemes. 
VIII. FROM RURAL TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT TO RIGHTS-BASED 
DEVELOPMENT IN RESILIENT PLACES 
As we have shown, a great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the role 
of GIs in fostering development in the Global South. Recent attention to how GI 
regimes are governed and considerations of the ideal forms of state involvement 
has been especially welcome. Rather than see GI regimes as apolitical technical 
administrative frameworks, we suggest they be envisioned as emerging public 
goods, which must be forged to redress extant forms of social inequality and foster 
the inclusion and political capacities of the most marginalized actors in commodity 
value chains. Such concerns need to move beyond a focus on the state as the only 
relevant actor that might ensure that GIs and other MICOs serve to foster greater 
equities in rural development, particularly in regions suffering the legacies of 
colonial forms of labor relations and Green Revolution externalities in which 
racialized and gendered forms of dispossession are often combined with 
environmental degradation. Unfortunately, these legacies are not being addressed 
by state initiatives, which tend to use GIs primarily as marketing tools that reify and 
fetishize territories while ignoring the histories of human labor and social relations 
of production that have produced them and their legacies of social injustice. Such 
issues are, however, the focus of new social movements which are actively 
reforming practices of certification to attend to such issues, Moreover, new 
certifications attempt to link place-based values, productive activities, and 
consumer priorities in new networks of commitment to agricultural, economic, 
environmental, and social change. Such decolonizing activities might provide 
normative models for the future of GI governance and influence the creation of 
other MICOs and their regulation. To move in this direction would shift the 
emphasis in developing GIs from following European models of rural territorial 
development to forging models of rights-based development more dedicated to 
maintaining place-based resilience. 
The use of European models of IP such as GIs for rural territorial 
development in the Global South has too often been focused on state economic 
aspirations rather than local social needs and environmental priorities. It has been 
oriented primarily to export markets, marketing essentialist narratives surrounding 
niche goods in a social imaginary geared to foreign consumer (and tourist) 
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preferences rather than the security of local producers and consumers. 
Environmental concerns have been largely marginalized in these initiatives, as have 
race and gender issues. We need territorial models for rural development that 
capitalize upon locally differentiated goods but do so in a fashion more sensitive to 
social justice issues, focused on reducing inequality, better integrating the rural poor, 
combining urban and rural activities in dynamic agricultural markets, and building 
political as well as social capital through greater participatory local decision 
making.261 Such models understand territories to be socially-produced, place-based 
sources of identity created through collective productive transformation and 
institutional development. 
These alternative models for rural territorial development (e.g., GAS and 
ZBNF) are aligned with rights-based development norms, which reject economic 
growth as the primary impetus for planning, consider economic, political, social, 
and cultural rights to be mutually constitutive, redress asymmetries of power, and 
prioritize issues of non-discrimination and justice in administration and inclusive 
participation in decision-making, production activities, and the distribution of 
benefits.262 Identifying its subjects as dignified and capable rather than backward 
and in need of charity, rights-based development puts emphasis on how new 
projects and institutions create opportunities for residents to make claims on 
others,263 scrutinizing the legitimacy of institutions and structures in local social 
contexts according to local concepts of fairness and equity as well as international 
human rights principles. Such models do not focus on the state as the exclusive or 
even the primary actor responsible for recognizing local rights. Instead, they situate 
the state as one of what must necessarily be a multiscalar assemblage of actors that 
includes NGOs, social movements, and transnational as well as rural-urban 
networks of civil society actors who hold rights-based obligations to others in 
relationships that privilege local deliberations in project and policy implementation 
as practices of self-determination. In so doing, rights-based development models 
are more sensitive to place-based cultural practices and their significance, 
particularly to minoritized and indigenous peoples whose traditional environmental 
practices hold promise for revitalizing the resilience of lands and their resources. 
Only under such conditions will GIs, linked to transnational certifications attuned 
to both social equity and environmental resilience, advance objectives of 
decolonization and self-determination while reducing historically entrenched forms 
of dispossession. Fortunately, as we have seen, there are multiple projects of 
certification moving in this direction, leaving us with some hope for the evolution 
of GIs in our shared global futures. 
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